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ILLUSTRATIONS OF LOGIC

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PREFATORY NOTE.



IN the following collection, illustrating fundamental processes of Deductive Logic, with examples taken from general literature, the compiler has had in view, primarily, the needs of teachers of the subject. Many of the manuals in common use present those processes (particularly the syllogism) in the form of what Dr. Venn aptly terms "prepared material"; and the instructor consequently finds difficulty in convincing his hearers that the logic of the class-room bears any relation to thought as met with in ordinary discussion and in books. Thus, without attempting a comprehensive treatment of "rhetorical logic" such as Jevons had in view, but unfortunately did not live to carry out, it yet seems possible to offer a little volume that may serve some purpose as an adjunct to any well-known handbook — not in any sense as a substitute. Should a timorous objection be urged that several of the specimens selected involve questions *quae in sermone et opinione positae sunt*, as Bacon puts it, the reply is that the student also has been kept in mind. In the present writer's experience the timely introduction of a syllogism of controversial, or even of polemical interest has often proved the only means of relieving the undeniable tedium of

rigorously conventional Formal Logic ; it rests with the lecturer himself not to use his subject as a vehicle for slyly conveying or enforcing his private convictions.

Some explanation is needed of the fact that this collection begins at once with the syllogism. It is true that, in discussing Terms and Propositions, some of the processes admit of tolerably easy literary illustration. For example, to take but one instance, the common fallacy of applying simple conversion to the universal affirmative proposition generally assumes a livelier aspect for the learner when it is shown to have been recognized by Prior in the following epigram :—

Yes, every poet is a fool :
 By demonstration Ned can show it :
 Happy, could Ned's inverted rule,
 Prove every fool to be a poet.

But as in most text-books ample attention is given to these somewhat formal methods, of which the practical disciplinary value lies in their very formality, it has seemed better to present in this volume only examples of "mediate inference," of miscellaneous fallacies of common occurrence, together with a few arguments occupying the *terrain vague* where logic and rhetoric so often elude precise delimitation. Nor has it been thought advisable to arrange these in such classified series as immediately to suggest either their soundness or their unsoundness. The desire to assist one's fellow-workers in enlivening a lecture — or an examination paper — is perhaps not altogether misplaced. Moreover, if the student can thus be made to feel that the intellectual

training of logic comes, in part at least, from its mode of dealing with ideas expressed in language, and not exclusively from the manipulation of symbols, he is less likely to invent for himself any equivalent of the saying that "Logic is neither a Science nor an Art—but a dodge."

MCGILL COLLEGE, MONTREAL,
June, 1899.

MOCKMODE. Form the Proposition by Mode and Figure, Sir.

ROEBUCK. . . . Blow your nose, Child ; and have a care of dirting
your Philosophical Slabbering-bib. Your starch'd
Band, set by Mode and Figure, Sir. . . . Now you have
left the University, learn, learn.

FARQUHAR. *Love and a Bottle, Act III.*

ILLUSTRATIONS OF LOGIC.



1. All human things are subject to decay,
And, when fate summons, monarchs must obey.

DRYDEN: *Mac Flecknoe*.

2. I never held it my *forte* to be a severe reasoner, but I can see that if whatever is best is A, and B happens to be best, B must be A, however little you might have expected it beforehand.

GEORGE ELIOT: *Daniel Deronda*, ch. 52.

3. I deem it impossible for any of the great monarchies of Europe to last much longer; all of them have flourished, and every state that is flourishing is already in a condition of decline.

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU.

4. I would have no dealings with my brother, and I put my conduct upon a syllogism. I said, "St. Paul bids me avoid those who cause divisions; you cause divisions; therefore I must avoid you."

NEWMAN: *Apologia*, p. 47.

5. England and Ireland should have one executive power. But the legislature has a most important share

of the executive power. Therefore, Great Britain and Ireland should have one legislature.

MACAULAY: *On the Repeal of the Union.*

6. It appears as if all our concrete manifestations of selfishness might be the conclusions of as many syllogisms, each with this principle as the subject of its major premise, thus: Whatever is me is precious; this is me; therefore this is precious. Whatever is mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore, this must not fail.

JAMES: *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 318.

7. A Liberal believes in liberty, and Liberty signifies the non-intervention of the State.

RENAN.

8. . . . Nature craves . . .

All dues be rendered to their owners; now
What nearer debt in all humanity
Than wife is to the husband?

Troilus and Cressida, II, 2.

9. Principles recognized by all persons of common sense are innate; we and our party are persons of common sense; and consequently the principles we profess must be innate.

10. That which causes a balance of good is right, according to utilitarians; and therefore persecution may sometimes be right.

LESLIE STEPHEN.

11. No man should fear death, for it is according to nature; and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

MARCUS AURELIUS.

12. Power pleases the violent and proud; wealth delights the placid and timorous. Youth, therefore, flies at power; and age grovels after riches.

13. Discontent is an essential condition of progress. But discontent means sorrow. Continued progress requires chronic discontent, and therefore chronic sorrow.

J. W. BARLOW: *The Ultimatum of Passivism*, p. 37.

14. Raising the wages of day-labourers is wrong; for it does not make them live better, but only makes them idler, and idleness is a very bad thing for human nature.

JOHNSON: in *Boswell*....

15. All concluded that happiness was the chief Good, and ought to be the Ultimate End of Man; that as this was the End of Wisdom, so Wisdom was the Way to Happiness.

SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE: *Of Gardening*.

16. I am walking with a friend in the garden, and we see a moth alight upon a flower. He exclaims: "What a beautiful butterfly!" Whereupon I remark: "That is not a butterfly; it is a moth." If he asks me how I know that, the answer is: "Because butterflies, when they alight, close their wings vertically; moths expand them horizontally."

G. H. LEWES,....

17. All parents are not wise. They cannot all endure to hear of any... opinions but their own.

JOHN MORLEY: *On Compromise*, p. 134.

18. I take it to be certain that whatever can, by just reasoning, be inferred from a principle that is necessary,

must be a necessary truth. Thus, as the axioms in mathematics are all necessary truths, so are all the conclusions drawn from them ; that is, the whole body of that science.

REID: *Essays*.

19. Here are two syllogisms, having equivalent practical conclusions, yet not only different, but even contradistinguished :—

I. It is my duty to love all men : but I am myself a man : *ergo*, it is my duty to love myself equally with others.

II. It is my nature to love myself : but I cannot realise this impulse of nature, without acting to others as if I loved them equally with myself : *ergo*, it is my duty to love myself by acting towards others as if I loved them equally with myself.

COLERIDGE: *The Friend*, December, 1820.

20. No ; the Dean (Swift) was no Irishman ; no Irishman ever gave but with a kind word and a kind heart.

THACKERAY: *Lectures on the English Humourists*.

21. Every religion, every society that has not as its principle the immortality of the soul can be upheld only by extraordinary providence ; the Jewish religion did not hold the immortality of the soul as a principle ; hence it was maintained by an extraordinary providence.

WARBURTON: *Quoted by Voltaire (Dict. Phil., Art. "Âme")*.

22. But every man cannot distinguish between pedantry and poetry ; every man therefore is not fit to innovate,

DRYDEN.

23. We have a very clear idea, and a very distinct notion of the liberty we are speaking about ; whence it follows that this notion is very true, and that consequently the thing it represents is very certain.

BOSSUET : *Traité du libre arbitre.*

24. The more a bad man has to do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him, and injurer and injured cannot be friends.

PLATO : *Lysis*, 214.

25. No nation admits of an abstract definition ; all nations are beings of many qualities and many sides.

BAGEHOT : *Physics and Politics*, p. 61.

26. Every idea that we have is conditioned by being an idea of what exists, either as a whole or in parts ; and therefore our idea of the existence of God proves that existence.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE.

27. Our ideas reach no farther than our experience : we have no experience of divine attributes and operations : I need not conclude my syllogism ; you can draw the inference yourself.

HUME : *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, Part II.

28. The impossibility I am in of proving the non-existence of God discloses that existence to me.

LA BRUYÈRE : *Des Esprits Forts.*

29. Some modern theologians assert that an extravagant or contradictory doctrine must be divine; since no man alive could have thought of inventing it.

GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, Vol. IV, p. 70, note.

30. Hence we sue for pardon; and so we acknowledge ourselves to be offenders; for the unguilty needeth no pardon.

LATIMER: *The Sixth Sermon on the Lord's Prayer*.

31. No secret trial is expedient; for it invariably casts a suspicion on the integrity of the judges.

32. The soundest of ethical philosophers always account virtue to be an end in itself; and as the votaries and advocates of a purely hedonistic type deny that virtue is its own reward, they cannot be ranked among the soundest of ethical philosophers.

33. Correction in itself is not cruel. Children, being not reasonable, can be governed only by fear.

JOHNSON.

34. All men are born under government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his father or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance.

Locke's Interpretation of Filmer's Theory of Patriarchal Government.

35. Of every empire all the subordinate communities are liable to taxation; because they all share the

benefits of government, and therefore ought to furnish their proportion of the expense.

SAMUEL JOHNSON: *Taxation no Tyranny.*

36. No two languages furnish equipollent words, — their phrases differ, their syntax and their idioms still more widely. But a translation, strictly so called, requires an exact conformity in all these particulars, and also in numbers; therefore it is impossible.

THURLOW TO COWPER.

37. "Very few," said the poet, "live by choice. Every man is placed in the present condition by causes which acted without his foresight, and with which he did not always willingly co-operate; and therefore you will rarely meet one who does not think the lot of his neighbour better than his own." JOHNSON: *Rasselas*, ch. 16.

38. "There is no style in which some man may not, under some circumstances, express himself. There is therefore no style which the drama rejects, none which it does not occasionally require." MACAULAY: *Machiavelli*.

39. Our voluntary service he requires,
Not our necessitated. Such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find; for how
Can hearts not free be tried whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose?

MILTON: *Paradise Lost*, V, 529-34.

40. There is no merit in the relief of distress by a charitable man, for the one who gives to the needy is merely gratifying his own feelings of pity, and no one holds that such gratification is deserving of special commendation.

41. Recent legislation has in one respect proved both onerous and unjustifiable; for by placing restrictive duties on the importation of books, pictures, and music it has laid a heavy burden on many who are ill able to bear it, and it taxes some of the aids to higher culture. Now, higher culture is not a mere luxury; the country cannot do without it.

42. It being granted, by definition, that all connotative terms convey to the mind the notion of a definite attribute, or of definite attributes, in the concepts they serve to denote; it must follow that no proper (singular) term, not given for connotative purposes, can *in se* be connotative, for beyond the fact of its denoting, no proper name has any meaning.

Extracted from an article on "Terms."

43. A tax is a payment exacted by authority from part of the community for the benefit of the whole. All taxes then are acts of government; and since every act of government aims at public good, there should be a necessary connection between taxation and the public weal.

44. There is a Spanish proverb which declares that Heaven always looks favorably on kindly desires and

good intentions ; now, since Heaven, as you say, has paid no heed to your desires, these cannot have been good.

45. The best of us being unfit to die, what an inexpressible absurdity to put the worst to death.

HAWTHORNE.

46. Swift is praised as the friend to liberty. He was not that : he was the enemy of injustice. He resisted certain flagrant acts of oppression, and tried to redress his country's wrongs, but he never thought of the liberties of his country.

H. CRABB ROBINSON : *Diary*.

47. A prince without letters is a pilot without eyes. All his government is groping. In sovereignty it is a most happy thing not to be compelled ; but so it is the most miserable not to be counselled. And how can he be counselled that cannot see to read the best counselors (which are books) ; for they neither flatter us nor hide from us ?

BEN JONSON : *Discoveries*.

48. We are not persecutors of belief. We respect the inner life of conscience, and wish it to be free.

A. AULARD : *Revue Bleue*, April 22, 1899.

49. He is free who lives as he wishes to live. . . . Not one of the bad lives as he wishes. Nor is he then free.

EPICETUS : *Discourses*, IV, 1.

50. Without grace no one can pray, and yet grace is to be imparted to those only who duly ask for it. That is, grace is granted only to those who have it already.

H. CRABB ROBINSON : *On a sermon of Arnold's*.

Diary, Vol. 11, p. 220.

51. I say then that sovereignty, being but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign, who is a collective being, can be represented by nobody but himself: power can indeed be transmitted, but not will.

ROUSSEAU: *Social Contract*, II, 1.

52. PASCAL. God is good, and good is God: definition, O my friend, can go no farther than this. All things therefore which are not God, are of themselves evil.

H. D. TRAILL: *The New Lucian*, p. 119.

53. "No man that lives is altogether happy,"
or

"There is no man that is or can be free,"
is a maxim; but it becomes an enthymeme by the addition of the next line:

"For money is his master or else Fortune."

ARISTOTLE: *Rhetoric*, Bk. II, ch. 21 (transl. by Weldon).

54. Society is a necessary institution. Hence the Christian religion is of divine origin, for it is the only means of bringing society to a state of perfection.

LACORDAIRE.

55. Cromwell, Mr. Froude tells us, held Romanism to be 'morally poisonous'; therefore Cromwell did not tolerate. We have decided that it is no longer poisonous; therefore we do tolerate.

LESLIE STEPHEN: *Poisonous Opinions*.

56. Veillot, in a striking sentence, expressed with great candor the policy of his party. 'When you are

the masters,' he said to the Liberals and Protestants, 'we claim perfect liberty for ourselves, as your principles require it; when we are the masters we refuse it to you, as it is contrary to our principles.'

W. E. H. LECKY, *Democracy and Liberty*, Vol. II, p. 20.

57. The evils of life all pass away in time; no transitory things demand a moment's serious thought; and therefore, nothing upon which we should rightly dwell is to be placed among the evils of life.

58. It is indisputable that some persons deserving of attention are fools; for some fools are capable of telling the truth, and any one capable of telling the truth is deserving of attention.

59. Who has many wishes has but little will; who has but little will is infirm of purpose. Infirmity of purpose is therefore commonly attendant upon excessive distribution of desires.

60. A bad man without conscience you cannot call a fool for not acting as if he had one. He neglects no elements of happiness about which he cares; and a career which would make better men miserable brings him no distress.

JAMES MARTINEAU: *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 76.

61. Persons given to constant interruption deserve not to be trusted, for Lavater declares that "Who interrupts often is inconstant and insincere."

62. A French philosopher wrote, "All becomes legitimate and even virtuous on behalf of the public safety." Construct two arguments on this basis, showing the extreme limits to which the principle assumed may be applied.

63. According to the law of the land, no one is eligible to the presidency who was not born on American soil; consequently, as none of the newly arrived emigrants was born on American soil, it is useless for any one of them to aspire to that high office.

64. It is precisely because we believe that opinion, and nothing but opinion, can effect great permanent changes, that we ought to be careful to keep this most potent force honest, wholesome, fearless, and independent.

JOHN MORLEY: *On Compromise*, p. 78.

65. All finitude, all determination, according to the well-known Spinozistic aphorism, is negation, and negation cannot constitute reality. To know the reality of things, therefore, we have to abstract from their limits: therefore the only reality is the infinite.

EDWARD CAIRD: *Cartesianism; Essays*, Vol. II, p. 291.

66. *Good and Evil*, in will and character, cannot be reduced to the *True and False*; because the latter are unsusceptible of degrees, which attach to the very essence of the former.

JAMES MARTINEAU: *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 470.

67. Theological truth, sometimes at least, professes to rest to some extent on experience, and to be a fair

inference from observable facts. Consequently, if, as must clearly be the only correct way, we interpret experience as including facts and all legitimate inferences from these, it may be urged that we are bound to include theological ideas in our investigation.

JAMES SULLY: *Pessimism*, p. 159.

68. Capital punishment is a violation of natural justice. No society has a right to deprive the individual of that which he has not obtained from society.

Argument of a Portuguese in defence of the abolition of capital punishment in his country.

69. Unmarried men are . . . not always best subjects, for they are light to run away, and almost all fugitives are of that condition.

BACON: *Of Marriage and Single Life*.

70. We do not hold you responsible for your opinions, but for the expression of them. Belief is independent of the will; not so, expression of belief: the latter is a voluntary act.

71. Those are the best Governments, where the best men govern; and the difference is not so great in the Forms of Magistracy as in the Persons of Magistrates; which may be the sense of what was said of old (taking wise and good men to be meant by Philosophers), that the best Governments were those, where Kings were Philosophers, or Philosophers Kings.

SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE: *Essay on Government*.

72. It must be understood above all things that the principle of hatred is contrariety and repugnance; and

in this respect, it is not comprehensible that one should hate truth in itself and in a general sense, "for," as the great St. Thomas very well declares, "what is in this manner vague and universal is never repugnant to any one, and consequently cannot be an object of hatred."

BOSSUET: *Second Sermon for Passion Sunday.*

73. Fortitude is very well defined by the Stoic philosophers when they call it a virtue contending for justice and honesty. No man therefore, by baseness and treachery, has ever got the name and reputation for true courage; for nothing can ever be virtuous or creditable that is not just.

CICERO: *De Officiis*, I, 19 (Cockman's transl.).

74. That which was profitable, therefore, prevailed, because it was honest withal; which had it not been, it could never have been profitable.

CICERO: *De Officiis*, III, 10 (Cockman's transl.).

75. Since the beginning of the century, the consumption of meat has more than doubled; that of wine has doubled; coffee has increased threefold, and sugar tenfold; while beer has risen seventy per cent. in consumption. Now as a rich man consumes no more meat, coffee, sugar, etc., in 1894 than in 1800, it is the working classes who have increased their sum of pleasures.

ALFRED RAMBAUD: *Hist. de la Civil. Contemp. en France.*

76. He who confines himself to the imitation of an individual, as he never proposes to surpass, so he is not

likely to equal, the object of his imitation. He professes only to follow ; and he that follows must necessarily be behind. SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS: *The Sixth Discourse*.

77. There can be no absolute perfection in any creature ; because every creature is derived from something of a superior existence, and dependent on that source for its own existence. No created being can be all-wise, all-good, and all-powerful, because his powers and capacities are finite and limited ; consequently whatever is created must, in its own nature, be subject to error, irregularity, excess and imperfectness.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN : *Dialogue between Philocles and Horatio, Works*, Vol. II, p. 50.

78. Honorable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and sign of power. . . . Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honorable ; as being the contempt of small difficulties and dangers. And irresolution, dishonorable ; as a sign of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages : for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little ; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity.

HOBBS : *Leviathan*, Part II, 10.

79. My opinion, says each man, is true : moreover the truth will prevail ; and hence it follows that my opinion, whatever it may be, represents the future faith of the world.

80. Now we can imitate only what interests us strongly ; he, therefore, who can imitate many things, is he who is interested in many things.

J. R. SEELEY : *Lectures and Essays*, p. 177.

81. Perfection is synonymous with goodness in the highest degree ; and hence to define good conduct in terms of perfection, is indirectly to define good conduct in terms of itself. Naturally, therefore, it happens that the notion of perfection, like the notion of goodness, can be framed only in relation to ends.

HERBERT SPENCER : *The Data of Ethics*, ch. 3.

82. Whatever is included in this finite world is finite, limited both in virtue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and natural conditions of a body ; for there is nothing but a body which hath a superficial part, and is barred and fastened in a place. CHARRON : *On Wisdom*.

83. Slavery in the Jewish times was not the slavery of negroes ; and therefore if you confine slavery to negroes, you lose your sheet anchor, which is the Bible argument in favour of slavery.

Quoted in John Bright's *IVth Speech on America*, 1866.

84. The following pairs of propositions being respectively taken as premises, state clearly whether or no any syllogistic conclusion is inferrible ; and complete the possible syllogism.

- A. No labor is hired outside of the community.
All labor is rewarded alike.

- B. All functionaries are, by reason of their office, exempt from parental control.
No one exempt from parental control is less than twenty-one years of age.
- C. All reasoning, says Hobbes in *Leviathan*, is computation.
All computation ultimately resolves itself into addition and subtraction.
- D. All these philosophies represent fundamental tendencies in human nature.
All these philosophies have run long and distinguished careers.
- E. Holiness, declares a philosopher, is a consciousness of sin with a consciousness of the victory over sin.
No holiness, says another, is innate in man.

85. No savage is free. All over the world his daily life is regulated by a complicated and apparently most inconvenient set of customs as forcible as laws.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK: *Origin of Civilization*, p. 301.

86. Reason is an entirely personal faculty. When therefore we assert anything in the name of reason, we do so in the name of our reason; certainty has no other basis, no other criterion than our individual feeling, — which is absurd. Hence reason can give us no absolute certainty, and is thus convicted of impotence. We must therefore seek some other authority.

COUSIN: *Philosophie Contemporaine*.

87. Since every man is born with equal natural rights, he is entitled to an equal protection of them with all other men; and since government is that protection, right reason and experience alike demand that every person shall have a voice in the government upon perfectly equal and practicable terms.

GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS: *The Right of Suffrage*, 1867.

88. The mystical or Quietist argument of the Neoplatonists was that all perturbation is a pollution of the soul; that the act of suicide is accompanied by, and springs from perturbation, and that therefore the perpetrator ends his days by a crime.

W. E. H. LECKY: *History of European Morals*,
Vol. II, p. 44.

89. That which is good must be something useful, and the perfectly good man should pay heed to it. But no such man would ever repent of having refused any pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful.

90. Pleasure is that which is so in itself: good is that which approves itself as such on reflection, or the idea of which is a source of satisfaction. All pleasure is not, therefore (morally speaking), equally good; for all pleasure does not equally bear reflecting on.

HAZLITT: *The Spirit of the Age*.

91. It has been argued, on the ground of the following propositions from Shelley's *Defence of Poetry*, that poets are true utilitarians: "The production and assurance of pleasure in the highest sense is true utility.

Those who produce and preserve this pleasure are poets or poetical philosophers.”

92. Shelley himself, in the same essay, assents to the declaration that Poetry is not Logic, because “it is not subject to the control of the active powers of the mind.”

93. Nature is infallible; for the Law of an infallible Lawgiver must needs be infallible; and Nature is the Law as well as the Art of God.

JAMES HARRINGTON: *The Mechanics of Nature*.

94. That which is not just is not law; and that which is not law ought not to be obeyed.

ALGERNON SIDNEY: *Discourses on Government*, III, 11.

95. It is logically, whether practically so or not, quite conceivable that if the end be not the production, but the distribution of wealth in a particular country, its circumstances may be such as to justify protection as a means to this end.

R. B. HALDANE: *Life of Adam Smith*, p. 153.

96. We are told that a beginning of life is inconceivable. Living organisms cannot have been developed, as it is not shown that they have been developed, from inanimate matter. Every living thing, then, is a continuation of some previously living thing; and the soul should therefore be continuous with a previous soul.

LESLIE STEPHEN: *What is Materialism?*

97. In proportion as opinions are open and divulged, they are harmless. Opinions become dangerous to a state only when persecution makes it necessary for men to communicate their ideas under the bond of secrecy. Do you believe it possible that the calamity which now rages in Ireland would have come to its present height, if the people had been allowed to meet and divulge their grievances? CHARLES JAMES FOX: *Repeal of the Treason and Sedition Bills*, 1797.

98. All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. An heritable crown, or an heritable throne, or by what other fanciful names such things may be called, have no other significant explanation than that mankind are heritable property. To inherit a government is to inherit the people, as if they were flocks and herds.

PAINÉ: *Rights of Man*.

99. Men who endeavor to imitate us we like much better than those who endeavor to equal us. Imitation is a sign of esteem, but competition of envy.

100. God and truth are one and the same thing; whence we must conclude that every truth which the human intellect is capable of receiving comes to it from God; that without Him it would know no truth, and that He has granted to men, according to times and circumstances, all truths that were necessary to them.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE: *Les Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg*.

101. It is the intention which gives to our acts their real human meaning, their moral worth. Apart from

its intention an act is merely the production of an intellectual machine. We cannot say that an action is really good, although it may be good in its outward form and drift, until we know something of the purpose with which the agent went to work ; and thus many actions, in themselves excellent, are corrupted by a bad motive. LIDDON : *Sermon on "The Premature Judgments of Man."*

102. Forty years ago I was not, and there was in me no power of ever becoming, just as it does not depend on me, who now am, to cease from being ; I have therefore had a beginning, and I continue to be through something outside of myself, lasting after me, and better and more powerful than myself.

LA BRUYÈRE : *Des Esprits Forts.*

103. Those who will come after us will perhaps know more than we do, and will think very much better of themselves on that account ; but will they really be happier or wiser ? Are we, who know much, better than our fathers who knew so little ?

VAUVENARGUES : *Réflexions*, 537.

104. There is certainly no reason why any individual should sacrifice others for himself alone ; neither is there any why society should purchase peace by the ruin of one of its own members. Society never has the right to punish, but only to correct. Every punishment which has not for its object the happiness of the individual at whom it is directed, is an injustice.

FORTIA.

105. One cannot have a great soul, or an acute mind, without some passion for letters. The arts are devoted to depicting the characteristics of beautiful nature; the sciences, to truth. The arts and sciences comprise everything that is noble and useful in thought; so that those who reject them have nothing left but what is unworthy of being depicted or taught.

VAUVENARGUES: *De L'Esprit Humain*, XXVIII.

106. God can only have made us for himself—in order that we should know Him, for instance. Now, our minds are finite and God is infinite. We must therefore exist eternally in order to know Him; for a finite mind requires infinite time to see an infinite being.

MALEBRANCHE.

107. My grandmother would say, for example: “Whatever sin is committed against an infinite being is an infinite evil. Every infinite evil deserves infinite punishment; therefore every sin of man deserves an infinite punishment.” My Uncle Bill, on the other side, would say: “No act of a finite being can be infinite. Man is a finite being; therefore no sin of man can be infinite. No finite evil deserves infinite punishment. Man’s sins are finite evils; therefore man’s sins do not deserve infinite punishment.” When the combatants had got thus far, they generally looked at each other in silence.

H. B. STOWE: *Old Town Folks*.

108. When the eyelids wink at a flash of light, or a threatened blow, a reflex action takes place, in which

the afferent nerves are the optic, the efferent, the facial. When a bad smell causes a grimace, there is a reflex action through the same motor nerve, while the olfactory nerves constitute the afferent channels. In these cases, therefore, reflex action must be effected through the brain, all the nerves involved being cerebral.

HUXLEY: *Elementary Physiology*.

109. We have been saying in thousands of treatises on Logic, All men are mortal: Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. The elephant reasons: All boys are bun-giving animals; that biped is a boy; therefore I will hold out my trunk to him. A philosopher says, The barometer is rising, and therefore we shall have fine weather; his dog says, My master is putting on his hat, and therefore I am going to have a walk. A dog equals a detective in the sharpness with which he infers general objectionableness from ragged clothes. A clever dog draws more refined inferences. If he is not up to enough simple arithmetic to count seven, he can at least say, Everybody is looking so gloomy, that it must be Sunday morning.

LESLIE STEPHEN: *Essays on Freethinking and Plain-speaking*, p. 80.

110. I heard a philosopher say one day:—“I have the idea of a free will. Now round about me nothing is free. Hence it is within myself that I must have obtained this idea. Otherwise, it would come from nowhere, it would have no *raison d'être*; and thus by the mere idea which I have of my free will, I am certain that I am free.”

GEORGES RENARD: *L'Homme, est-il libre?* p. 53.

111. Men will be punished, and God is the one who will inflict the punishment; hence the punishment is just, and consequently he who is punished is guilty. He might therefore have acted otherwise, and possesses freedom within himself. He is consequently capable of determining his own actions.

LEIBNITZ: *Nouveaux Essais*, Bk. IV, ch. 17, sec. 4.

112. Let us take Locke's own instance, from his 4th Book, sec. 10, where, disdainfully discarding the syllogism, he asserts that the enthymeme is the sufficient account of our reasonings. "A just God will punish men for their evil works: Therefore men have free choice." Why does this conclusion: that men have free choice, flow from the fact, that a just God will punish their sins? Only because it is assumed that we are, of course, agreed upon another judgment; namely: *that freedom is essential to responsibility*. Unless that is virtually in the mind, the conclusion is not seen as certainly true. So that after all the full statement of the citation must take this form.

Freedom in the agent is necessary to a just responsibility.

God (who is just) will hold men responsible;
Therefore men are free agents.

R. L. DABNEY: *The Sensualistic Philosophy*, p. 267.

113. He (Rousseau) believes—and I with him—that one is born without vice, because without ideas; but for the same reason one is also born without virtue. If vice is foreign to human nature, virtue must be so likewise.

Both can only be acquired. This is why one is not deemed capable of sin before the age of seven years, because up to that time one can have no exact idea of justice and injustice, nor any knowledge of duties towards one's fellow-men.

HELVÉTIUS: *De L'Homme*, Sect. V, ch. 1.

114. As every Prince should govern, as he would desire to be governed if he were a Subject, so every Subject should obey, as he would desire to be obeyed if he were a Prince; since this Moral Principle of doing as you would be done by, is certainly the most undisputed and universally allowed of any other in the world, how ill so ever it may be practised by particular men.

SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE: *Of Popular Discontents*.

115. Having proved that the Right of a Father proceeds from the generation and education of his Children: That no man can have that Right over those whom he hath not begotten and educated: That every man hath it over those who owe their Birth and Education to him . . . it plainly appears, that no Father can have a Right over others, unless it be by them granted to him, and that he receive his Right from those who granted it.

ALGERNON SIDNEY: *Discourses Concerning Government*, I, 20.

116. "In vaine," said then old Melibee, "doe men
 The heavens of their fortunes fault accuse;
 Sith they know best what is the best for them:
 For they to each such fortune doe diffuse,
 As they do know each can most aptly use.
 For not that, which men covet most, is best;"

Nor that thing worst, which men do most refuse ;
 But fittest is, that all contented rest
 With that they hold ; each hath his fortune in his brest."

SPENSER: *The Faerie Queene*, VI, 9, 29.

117. Such orders as were commanded by God may not be changed in any case, only because God commanded them ; for, as God is everlasting, so is his word and commandment everlasting. Of the other side, such orders as have been devised by men may be broken, upon some good consideration, only because they were men that devised them ; for as men themselves be mortal, so all their wisdoms and inventions be but mortal.

BISHOP JEWEL: *Reply to Dr. Cole*.

118. Sufficiency, power, etc., are all desired, because they are esteemed a good. Good is the cause why all things are desired. For that which contains no good, either in reality or appearance, can never be desired. On the contrary, things not essentially good are desired because they appear to be real goods. Hence, good is esteemed as the cause and end of all things we desire.

BOETHIUS: *Consolations*.

119. Since it is certain that all right flows from the fountain of justice, so that nothing can possibly be any man's right that is not just, it is a most wicked thing in you to affirm, that for a king to be unjust, rapacious, tyrannical, and as ill as the worst of them ever was, is according to the right of kings.

MILTON: *A Defence of the People of England*.

120. Religion has its proper end in contemplation and in conduct. Art aims at presenting sensuous embodiment of thoughts and feelings with a view to intellectual enjoyment. Now many thoughts are incapable of sensuous embodiment ; they appear as abstractions to the philosophical intellect or as dogmas to the theological understanding. To effect an alliance between art and philosophy or art and theology in the specific region of either religion or speculation is, therefore, an impossibility.

J. A. SYMONDS: *Renaissance in Italy — The Fine Arts* — pp. 29, 30.

121. Having proved that the Latin commentary would not have been an intelligent servant, I will show why it would not have been an obedient one. He is obedient who has that good disposition which we call obedience. True obedience should have three things, without which it is none: it must be sweet, and not bitter ; entirely under command and not spontaneous ; and it must be limited and not unbounded. These three things it was impossible for the Latin commentary to possess ; and therefore it was impossible for it to be obedient.

DANTE: *Il Convito*, Bk. I, ch. 7 (transl. by K. Hillard).

122. The Venus of Milo has the left side of the head more developed than the other. . . . Henke, resting on this fact, holds that the Venus is not a faultless masterpiece, for, says he, the ideal or rather the normal countenance is perfectly symmetrical. This conclusion was rejected by Hasse, who undertook to demonstrate that

the normal countenance is clearly unsymmetrical and that the perfectly symmetrical countenance, if it exists, is an anomaly. BIERVLIET: *Revue Philosophique*, February, 1899.

123. I hold that a long poem does not exist. I maintain that the phrase, "a long poem," is simply a flat contradiction in terms. I need scarcely observe that a poem deserves its title only inasmuch as it excites, by elevating the soul. The value of the poem is in the ratio of this elevating excitement. But all excitements are, through a psychal necessity, transient. That degree of excitement which would entitle a poem to be called so at all, cannot be sustained throughout a composition of any great length. After the lapse of half-an-hour at the very utmost, it flags — fails — a revulsion ensues — and then the poem is in effect, and in fact, no longer such.

EDGAR ALLAN POE: *The Poetic Principle*.

124. The deductive inquirer . . . will argue thus: poetry appeals to the imagination, mathematics to the understanding. To work the imagination is more exciting than to work the understanding, and what is habitually exciting is usually unhealthy. But what is usually unhealthy will tend to shorten life; therefore poetry tends more than mathematics to shorten life; therefore on the whole poets will die sooner than mathematicians.

HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE: *Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works*, Vol. 1, p. 7.

125. That Alexander exerted his supreme authority over all his subjects is quite certain. And yet in this he

differed absolutely from a tyrant, such as the Greeks knew, that he called together his peers and asked them to pass legal sentence upon a subject charged with grave offences against the king. No Greek tyrant ever could do this, for he had around him no halo of legitimacy, and moreover he permitted no order of nobility among his subjects.

J. P. MAHAFFY: *Greek Life and Thought*, ch. 2.

126. By the manifest and plain words of the scriptures, and the consent of the most ancient authors before written, it is evident that neither the visions of angels, apparitions of the dead, nor miracles, nor all these joined together in one, are able or sufficient to make any one new article of our faith, or stablish anything in religion, without the express words of God; because all such things (as is before proved) may be, yes, and have been, through God's permission, for our sins' and unbelief's sake, done by the power of the devil himself, or feigned and counterfeited of his lively members, monks and friars, with other such hypocrites.

CRANMER: *A Confutation of Unwritten Verities*, ch. 11, 74.

127. We notice an important distinction between suffering for another and being punished for another. . . . Punishment implies guilt, and the notion of an innocent man being punished for the guilty is a moral contradiction. The innocent man may and does suffer for the guilty; that he should be punished for the guilty is inconceivable, for guilt and with it moral condemnation are intransferable. To speak, therefore, of *Vicarious*

Suffering has nothing in it to shock morality : *Vicarious Punishment* (if the full meaning of the idea is realised) is immoral.

S. H. BUTCHER : *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*, p. 120.

128. When a manufactured object is so made as to be perfectly fitted for the purpose for which it is designed, when, as in the case of simple objects of universal use, the form has been so modified by continual and gradual improvements (without ulterior intention of making it more beautiful) as to have all that is requisite and nothing that is superfluous, and when in addition it is constructed in the manner best calculated to make it strong and durable, it has this beauty, which I call the beauty of fitness. Now these are the characteristics of all that kind of work of which the rules are handed down from father to son, or from master to apprentice, and which is called therefore traditional work ; consequently, we always find that traditional work has some elements of beauty in it. E. J. POYNTER : *Ten Lectures on Art*, pp. 6, 7.

129. Tragedy is the highest earnestness of poetry ; Comedy altogether sportive. Now earnestness . . . consists in the direction of the mental powers to an aim or purpose, and the limitation of their activity to that object. Its opposite, therefore, consists in the apparent want of aim, and freedom from all restraint in the exercise of the mental powers ; and it is therefore the more perfect, the more unreservedly it goes to work, and the more lively the appearance there is of purposeless fun and unrestrained caprice. AUG. W. VON SCHLEGEL : *Dramatic Art*, p. 147.

130. Liberty, indeed, though among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as that of protection ; inasmuch, as the end of the former is the progress and improvement of the race, — while that of the latter is its preservation and perpetuation. And hence, when the two come into conflict, liberty must, and ever ought, to yield to protection ; as the existence of the race is of greater moment than its improvement.

JOHN C. CALHOUN: *A Disquisition on Government.*

131. Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity, than by reading all manner of tractates, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.

MILTON: *Areopagitica.*

132. It is a singular misuse of terms to place a supposed perfection at the very beginning of a language. What is true, is that in ascending step by step the historical course of a language, and thus catching the latter in the very act of transformation, we distinguish with greater certainty the laws that govern its changes. Every language is thus more regular, simpler, more symmetrical in some sense, at the epoch of its origin and infancy, than at any other period of its existence or its development. But in no case that anyone knows of — in no art, science, or order of things — are simplicity,

regularity, or symmetry either synonyms or measures of perfection. Quite the contrary; and since languages have actually been compared to *organisms*, it must be remembered that any organism is nearer relative perfection, the more complex it is — that is, when composed of the union of a large number of parts, more delicately and subtly put together.

F. BRUNETIÈRE: *Études Critiques*, Vol. I, p. 6.

133. Reserve is restraint, and restraint is painful, and pain is intolerable to the self-indulgent.

H. D. TRAILL: *The New Lucian*, p. 71.

134. Want is the consequence of profusion, venality of want, and dependence of venality.

BOLINGBROKE: *The Idea of a Patriot King*.

135. Every body is in space; what is in space is in some one part of space; what is in one part of space may be in another; what may be in another part of space may change its space; what may change its space is movable; therefore, every body is movable.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON: *Logic*, Lect. XIX.

136. No rulers will do that which produces pain to themselves.

But the unfavorable sentiments of the people will give pain to them.

Therefore, no rulers will do anything which may excite the unfavorable sentiments of the people.

But the unfavorable sentiments of the people are excited by everything which hurts them.

Therefore, no rulers will do anything which may hurt the people.

MACAULAY: *James Mill's Essay on Government.*

137. Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness is gained by a right use of the things of life; and the right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them, are given by knowledge; the inference is that every man ought by all means to try to make himself as wise as he can.

138. True happiness cannot consist in things that are inconsistent with the nature and state of man. This . . . naturally flows from the very notion of good and evil. For whatever is inconsistent with the nature of a being, tends for this very reason to degrade or destroy it, to corrupt or alter its constitution; which being directly opposite to the preservation, perfection, and good of this being, subverts the foundation of its felicity. Wherefore reason being the noblest part of man, and constituting his principal essence, whatever is inconsistent with reason cannot form his happiness.

BURLAMAQUI: *The Principles of Natural Law*, Pt. I, ch. 6.

139. Warning, it is said, is the end of punishment. But a punishment inflicted, not by a general rule, but by an arbitrary discretion, cannot serve the purpose of a warning. It is therefore useless; and useless pain ought not to be inflicted.

MACAULAY: *Hallam's Constitutional History.*

140. All living, in the first place, however commonplace its aims, however accidental its ideals, involves a deep paradox. We long to live. Very well, then, we long to be active. For life means activity; and activity that again means longing, striving, suffering, lack, hoping for the end of the activity in which we are immediately engaged. . . . Life is will; and every will aims at its own completion, that is, at its own cessation. I will to be wiser than I am. Well, then, I will that my present foolishness shall cease. I will to get somebody's love; and that means that I will the cessation of my unloved condition. Every will aims at the attainment of its desire; and attainment is the death of just this desire, and so of just this act of will. And yet, on the whole, I will to live. J. ROYCE: *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 455.

141. Whether the universe is (a concourse of) atoms, or nature (is a system), let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering

then that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that happens.

M. AURELIUS: *Meditations*, X (transl. by Long).

142. Omnis concordia dependet ab unitate, quae est in voluntatibus. Genus humanum optime se habens est quaedam concordia; nam sicut unus homo optime se habens, et quantum ad animam, et quantum ad corpus, est concordia quaedam: et similiter domus, civitas, et regnum: sic totum genus humanum. Ergo genus humanum optime se habens ab unitate quae est in voluntatibus dependet. Sed hoc esse non potest; nisi sit voluntas una, domina et regulatrix omnium aliarum in unum. . . . Nec una ista potest esse, nisi sit Princeps unus omnium, cujus voluntas domina et regulatrix aliarum omnium esse possit. Quod si omnes consequentiae superiores verae, quod sunt; necesse est, ad optime se habere humanum genus, Monarchiam esse in mundo; et per consequens Monarchiam ad bene esse mundi.

DANTE: *De Monarchia*, Bk. I.

143. Haeckel seeks to get out of a difficulty by assuming that the principle of life has its origin in the physical and chemical properties of albuminous bodies. And how are these albuminous bodies formed? By the tendency of carbon towards manifold combinations with other elements. And what is the cause of this tendency and also of all other chemical properties of bodies? "I do not know," answers Haeckel. "Then," it may be replied, "if your hypothesis is sound, you have done

nothing more than remove the mystery a little farther, and if the cause of your vital principle springs in its turn from an unknown cause, your explanation is reduced to this :— The original cause of life is equal to x ."

ANTONIO FOGAZZARO.

144. There is no religion possible without a single visible Church.

There is no Church without government.

There is no government without sovereignty.

There is no sovereignty without infallibility.

Hence, there can be no religion without infallibility.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE: "*Le Pape*," as summed up by Edmond Scherer.

145. The Church, according to the Catholic doctrine, is the visible community, founded by Christ, of all the faithful, in which the active operation of purifying from sin and sanctifying mankind, developed in it during His existence on earth, is perpetuated, under the guidance of His Spirit, to the end of the world, by means of an apostolate, instituted by Him, and of uninterrupted duration. The bishops are the direct successors of the apostles. To them are transferred, through ordination and the laying on of hands, the same graces and spiritual gifts which their predecessors received from Christ, and which they, in like manner, transmit by ordination to the priests. The episcopate is, therefore, an institution ordained by God — the legitimate organ and exclusive vehicle of the Holy Spirit. And since an institution of this kind requires, for the purpose of asserting its unity, a centre, God has placed at the head of the whole Church

a supreme overseer, the successor of the Prince of the Apostles, St. Peter, as His sovereign Vicar and representative whose further duty it is to govern the church through authorities appointed by himself. The hierarchy — or the priesthood of the new dispensation — is essential, therefore, for the continuance and completion of the work of redemption. The episcopate, through its head, thus representing the church, its decisions on points of doctrine are consequently infallible.

GEFFCKEN: *Church and State* (transl. by E. F. Taylor),
Vol. I, ch. 11, pp. 293, 294.

146. Since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the word infinite be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word *finite* is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite.

CUDWORTH: *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, ch. 5.

147. I am a finite being, God is infinite: I am imperfect and defective. God is perfect and without defects. It is, therefore, impossible for me to be the cause of this idea. Either I cannot have such a conception at all, or its cause must be a being of like reality; *i.e.*, God himself. But I have the idea of God; and in this case, to have it is equivalent to having received it. Every con-

ception, as every phenomenon, has its cause. If I clearly and distinctly perceive that I cannot be this cause, I know just as clearly and distinctly that it must be without me; that there is, therefore, a being without me.

KUNO FISCHER: *Descartes and His School*, p. 344 (transl. by Cordy).

148. How reconcile the existence of evil with the being and rule of a wise and good God, almighty to effect what love proposes and wisdom plans? . . . There is but one answer to this question. What love proposes and wisdom plans must needs be good. This fundamental truth of practical reason is the only solution of the problem. In the view and intent of a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness, there can be no evil. Such a being sees and knows and does only good. What we call evil, therefore, the evil of our experience, when referred to its source, has precisely the same character with that which we call good. If God is good, and if all that is proceeds from him, there is no evil.

F. H. HEDGE: *Ways of the Spirit and Other Essays*. Quoted by James Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 56.

149. I. The aim of the Baconian philosophy is to found and increase the lordship of man, the domain of culture.

II. There can be no culture without discovery, which gives the powers of nature into the hands of man.

III. There can be no discovery without science, which brings the laws of phenomena into light.

IV. There can be no science without knowledge of nature.

V. This knowledge of nature can have but one course to pursue, namely, that of experience.

KUNO FISCHER: *Bacon*.

150. Every attempt to interpret the succession of mental phenomena by means of theorems originally devised to interpret the movements of matter, involves the assertion of materialism; the assertion of materialism involves the denial of personal immortality; the denial of personal immortality deprives morality of its principal sanction, and prevents us from having any higher ideal of life than the gratification of egoistic desires; *ergo*, we are justified in insinuating that philosophers who interpret mental manifestations by a reference to material structure are likely to be men of loose morals.

FISKE: *Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. 11, p. 434.

151. You know what Pericles said of his son's dog Azor;—Azor rules my boy, my boy rules his mother, his mother rules me, I rule Athens, Athens rules Greece, and Greece rules the world,—wherefore Azor is the ruler of the world. Same remark applies to Mdlle. Mimi Triboulette's dog, Bichon. Bichon governs Mdlle. Mimi, Mimi governs the Parisian public, the Parisian public governs Europe, Europe governs the two hemispheres; *ergo*, Bichon is the governor of the universe.

E. C. GRENVILLE MURRAY: *French Pictures in English Chalk*.

152. And the first thing I would do in my government, I would have nobody to control me, I would be

absolute ; and who but I ; now, he that is absolute can do what he likes ; he that can do what he likes can take his pleasure ; he that can take his pleasure can be content ; and he that can be content has no more to desire.

CERVANTES : *Sancho Panza in Don Quixote.*

153. A good king alone can derive his right to govern from God. The reason is plain : good government alone can be in the divine intention. God has made us to desire happiness ; he has made our happiness depend on society ; and the happiness of society depend on good or bad government. His intention was, therefore, that government should be good.

BOLINGBROKE : *The Idea of a Patriot King.*

154. Sovereignty cannot be represented, for the same reason that it cannot be alienated ; it consists essentially in the general will, and will is not representable : it is the same, or it is another ; there is no middle choice. The deputies of the people can therefore not be its representatives ; they are only commissioners : they can conclude nothing definitively. Every law unratified by the people is null and void : it is not a law at all. The English think themselves free, but are much mistaken ; they are so only during the election of members of parliament ; as soon as the latter are elected, the former are slaves ; they become nothing.

ROUSSEAU : *Social Contract*, III, 15.

155. The people are sovereign by natural right ; of this sovereignty, the suffrage is the external manifestation, and is consequently also a natural right.

All citizens share alike in this natural right, and are therefore all electors on the same footing and in the same manner or sense.

Sovereignty then dwells in the people, that is to say, in the electors; he who is elected receives it only by delegation, and is therefore the mandatory of his electors.

CHARLES BENOIST (Sybil), in *Revue Bleue*.

156. No one is born a slave; because every one is born with his natural rights.

No one can become a slave; because no one from being a person can become a thing, a subject of property. The supposed property of the master in the slave is, therefore, matter of usurpation, not of right. Hence, no slavery is justifiable.

PALEY.

157. I have already given the reader to understand that the description of liberty which seems to me the most comprehensive, is that of *security against wrong*. Liberty is therefore the object of all government. Men are more free under every government, even the most imperfect, than they would be if it were possible for them to exist without any government at all: they are more secure from wrong, more undisturbed in the exercise of their natural powers, and therefore more free, even in the most obvious and grossest sense of the word, than if they were altogether unprotected against injury from each other. But as general security is enjoyed in very different degrees under different governments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by the way of eminence called "free." Such governments

attain most completely the end which is common to all government. A free constitution of government and a good constitution of government are therefore different expressions for the same idea.

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH: *On the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations.*

158. It is, say the American advocates, the natural distinction of a freeman, and the legal privilege of an Englishman, that he is able to call his possessions his own, that he can sit secure in the enjoyment of inheritance or acquisition, that his house is fortified by the law, and that nothing can be taken from him but by his own consent. This consent is given for every man by his representative in parliament. The Americans, unrepresented, cannot consent to English taxation as a corporation, and they will not consent as individuals.

Of this argument, it has been observed by more than one, that its force extends equally to all other laws, for a freeman is not to be exposed to punishment, or be called to any onerous service, but by his own consent. The Congress has extracted a position from the fanciful Montesquieu, that "in a free state every man being a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government." Whatever is true of taxation, is true of every other law, that he who is bound by it, without his consent, is not free, for he is not concerned in his own government.

SAMUEL JOHNSON: *Taxation no Tyranny.*

159. It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that democracy is simply that form of govern-

ment in which the greater number are sovereign, for in oligarchies, and indeed in every government, the majority rules; or again oligarchy is that form of government in which a few are sovereign. Suppose the whole population of a city to be 1300, and that of these 1000 are rich, and do not allow the remaining 300, who are poor but free, and in all other respects their equals, a share of the government — no one will say that this is a democracy. In like manner, if the poor were few and the masters of the rich, who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government in which the rich majority have no share of office, an oligarchy. Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and oligarchy in which the rich; it is only an accident that the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise a government in which the offices were given according to stature, as is said to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy; for the number of tall or good-looking men is small. And yet oligarchy and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom. Both of them contain many other elements, and therefore we must carry our analysis further, and say that the government is not a democracy in which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the many who are not free, as at Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera: (for in each of these states, the nobles, who were also the earliest settlers, were held in chief honor, although they were but a few out of many).

Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government, because they exceed in number ; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed of large property before the Lydian War. But the form of government is a democracy when the free who are also poor and the majority govern, and oligarchy when the rich and noble govern, they being at the same time few in number.

ARISTOTLE: *Politics*, IV, 4 (Jowett's transl.).

160. Every minister acts upon the same idea that Mr. Burke writes ; namely, that the people must be hoodwinked, and held in superstitious ignorance by some bugbear or other ; and what is called the Crown answers this purpose, and therefore it answers all the purposes to be expected from it. PAINE: *Rights of Man*.

161. If the maxim of the compromiser were sound, it ought to be capable of universal application. Nobody has a right to make an apology for himself in this matter, which he will not allow to be valid for others. If one has a right to conceal his true opinions, and to practice equivocal conformities, then all have a right. One plea for exemption is in this case as good as another and no better. JOHN MORLEY: *On Compromise*, p. 172.

162. Gain is the end of all improvement, and nothing could deserve that name of which loss was to be the necessary consequence. But loss must be the necessary consequence of improving land for the sake of a produce of which the price could never bring back the expense.

If the complete improvement and cultivation of the country be, as it most certainly is, the greatest of all public advantages, this rise in the price of all those different sorts of rude produce, instead of being considered as a public calamity, ought to be regarded as the necessary forerunner and attendant of the greatest of all public advantages.

ADAM SMITH: *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. I, ch. II.

163. What distinguishes one being from another is its organization. That is what distinguishes a plant from a mineral, an animal in one species from one in another. Every being has therefore its own nature; and because of having its own nature, it is predestined by that nature to a certain end. If the end (purpose) of the bee, for example, is not that of the lion, and that of the lion again not identical with that of man, the reason of it can be found nowhere but in the difference of their respective natures. Every being is therefore organized in view of a certain end, so that, if one only knew its nature completely, one could deduce therefrom its intention or end. The end of a being is what we call its good. There is consequently an absolute identity between the good of a being and its end. Its good is to compass its end, to travel to the limit of the purpose for which it has been organized.

JOUFFROY: *Cours de droit naturel*, II^{me} Leçon.

164. The sum is, the relations of things cannot exist without the coexistence of the things themselves, or things cannot be related unless they are; whenever

therefore they are related they must be, and if eternally related, they must eternally be. Or thus, a thing must first be, before it can be related or have any other affection, and therefore cannot be related when it is not, then neither eternally related if not eternal, since otherwise it would be related before it is, that is, when it is not, which is impossible. If then the relations of things be eternal, the things themselves must be co-eternal with them, and since 't is as certain that there are such eternal relations as that there are eternal truths, I therefore conclude that the essences of things are eternal.

JOHN NORRIS: *The Theory of the Ideal World*, Vol. I, p. 80.

165. Since I prove it to be possible that atoms may be colorless, I will now show that it certainly is so. For every color is, or may be, changed into all colors whatsoever; but this is a transmutation which primordial elements must by no means undergo; since it is necessary that there should remain something unchangeable, lest all things should be reduced utterly to nothing. For whatsoever being changed, goes beyond its own limits, this change forthwith becomes the death or termination of that which it was before. Be cautious, therefore, not to tinge the seeds of things with colors, lest all things for your gratification should be reduced to nothing. LUCRETIUS: *De Rerum Naturâ*, II, 748-756 (Watson).

166. I will now show that there are things linked to no color from the beginning of time. Well, any color without any exception changes into any other: and this first-beginnings ought in no wise to do: something

unchangeable must remain over, that all things be not utterly reduced to nothing. For whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before. Therefore mind not to dye with color the seeds of things, that you may not have all things altogether returning to nothing.

LUCRETIUS: *De Rerum Naturâ*, II, 748-756 (Munro).

167. I am going to examine in this discourse the effect of nature and education upon the mind; for this purpose I must first determine what is meant by the word *nature*. This word can arouse in us a confused idea of a being or a power that has endowed us with all our senses. The senses are the source of all our ideas; without a sense, we are deprived of the ideas related therewith; for this reason, a man born blind has no idea of color; it is therefore evident that in this sense, mind must be wholly considered as a gift of nature.

HELVÉTIUS: *De L'Esprit*, *Discours* III, ch. 1.

168. For how the soul by mutation made in matter, a substance of another kind, should be excited to action: and how bodily alterations and motions should concern *that* which is subject to neither; it is a difficulty which confidence may sooner triumph on, than conquer. For *body* cannot act on anything but by motion; motion cannot be received but by *quantity* and *matter*; the *soul* is a stranger to such substantiality, and owns nothing of these, but that it is cloathed with by our deceived phancies; and therefore how can we conceive it subject to *material impressions*?

GLANVILL: *Scep sis Scientifica*, ch. 5.

169. But there is a still more irresistible argument proving to us the absurdity of innate principles. Every principle is a proposition : either it affirms, or it denies. Every proposition consists in the connection of at least two distinct ideas, which are affirmed to agree or disagree with each other. It is impossible that the proposition can be innate, unless the ideas to which it relates be also innate. A connection where there is nothing to be connected, a proposition where there is neither subject nor conclusion, is the most incoherent of all suppositions. But nothing can be more incontrovertible than that we do not bring pre-established ideas into the world with us.

WILLIAM GODWIN : *Political Justice*, Bk. I, ch. 4.

170. Such a science (of the *absolute*, the *unconditioned*, the *real*, viz. Metaphysics), according to Kant, must be unattainable by man ; for all knowledge is consciousness, and all consciousness implies a relation between the subject or person conscious, and the object or thing of which he is conscious. An object of consciousness cannot be the absolute ; for its existence as such implies an act of consciousness, and consciousness is a relation. It cannot be the unconditioned, for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, and these are conditions. It cannot be the real, for the laws of our consciousness can only give us things as they appear to us, and do not tell us what they are in themselves.

DEAN MANSEL : *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 172.

171. If one stage cannot properly present two rooms or houses, much less two countries or kingdoms, then

there can be no unity of place. But one stage cannot properly perform this; therefore, there can be no unity of place.

DRYDEN: *A Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy.*

172. If you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money; you have not borrowed and not repaid; then you do not owe me the money.

EPICETUS.

173. Every one must, of course, think his own opinions right; for if he thought them wrong, they would no longer be his opinions.

SAMUEL BAILEY: *Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions.*

174. The agreement of the representatives of the great European powers in session at The Hague (June, 1899), in favor of a reduction of standing armies would produce lasting benefit to civilisation, if it could be determined on; but as there is little likelihood of such agreement, we may infer that no benefit to civilisation will ensue.

Extract from newspaper leader.

175. For if scripture interpret itself, then we must apply these means to obtain the interpretation of scripture; since those who would use other means do not allow to scripture the power of expounding its own meaning.

WHITAKER: *Disputations.*

176. If self-denial be the essence of virtue, then it follows that the man who is naturally temperate, just, etc., is not virtuous; but that in order to be virtuous,

he must, in spite of his natural inclination, wrong his neighbor, and eat, and drink, etc., to excess.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: *Self-denial not the essence of virtue*,
Works, Vol. II, p. 64.

177. If that which is known may be overruled by that which is unknown, no being, not omniscient, can arrive at certainty.

JOHNSON: *Rasselas*, ch. 45.

178. If beauty in our own species was annexed to use, men would be much more lovely than women; and strength and agility would be considered as the only beauties.

BURKE: *The Sublime and Beautiful*, Sect. VI.

179. If man was created, he was created for some end; and being created perfect, the end to which he was destined could not but be perfect.

CHATEAUBRIAND: *Génie du Christianisme*, ch. 4.

180. Were it Crime, I should feel Remorse. Where there is no Remorse, Crime cannot exist. I am not sorry; therefore, I am innocent. Is the proposition a fair one?

The excellent Doctor admitted that it was not to be contested.

THACKERAY: *Burlesques*; "George de Barnwell."

181. If the accused person is guilty of the offence with which he is charged, he is deeply blamable and honest men should shun his society; but since the enquiry shews clearly that he was not guilty, what possible reason can you give for continuing to avoid him?

182. Could the point to be observed in a chemical analysis be sharply and distinctly isolated, we would rather take the testimony of a man who had no idea what to expect than of a man who knew well what to expect; but it cannot; and therefore we say that the evidence of a chemist is worth ten times as much as the evidence of a non-chemist.

R. H. HUTTON: *The Incarnation and Principle of Evidence; Essays*, Vol. 1, p. 239.

183. Make the necessaries of life too expensive for the poor to reach them, and you will save their money. If they buy but few candles, they will pay but little tax; and if they buy none, the tax, as to them, will be annihilated.

COWPER: *On Pitt's proposal to tax candles.*

184. The following is a reply sent to a dunning bookseller: I never ordered the book; if I did, you didn't send it; if you sent it, I never got it; if I got it, I paid for it; if I didn't, I won't.

185. If the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also.

EPICETUS.

186. TOUCHSTONE.—Why, if thou never wast at court, thou never sawest good manners; if thou never sawest good manners, then thy manners must be wicked; and wickedness is sin, and sin is damnation. Thou art in a parlous state, shepherd.

As You Like It, III, 2.

187. As to Moses, I suppose it will be allowed me that he could not have persuaded 600,000 men that he had brought them out of Egypt, through the Red Sea ; fed them forty years without bread, by miraculous manna, and the other matters of fact recorded in his books, if they had not been true. Because every man's senses that were then alive must have contradicted it. And therefore he must have imposed upon all their senses, if he could have made them believe it when it was false, and no such things done.

LESLIE: *A Short and Easy Method with a Deist*, p. 8.

188. I had been told before I came out on this expedition that if there were wolves in the district, there would be abundance of red deer in the vicinity. Well, I have had three days' capital shooting, — in all, five red deer, — but what surprises me most is that I have not seen track or trail of wolf in all that time ; and I certainly expected to, after killing my first deer.

Extract from private letter.

189. Saint Augustine has said: Reason would never submit if it did not judge this submission to be duty. It is therefore right that reason should submit when it judges this to be a duty.

D'Alembert replies: If reason submits to its own judgment, it submits to itself ; and if it submits to itself alone, this is no submission and reason still rules.

ALFRED DE VIGNY: *Stello*, ch. 8.

190. If everything is matter, and if the thought within myself, as in all other men, is only an effect of the

arrangement of particles of matter, who has introduced into the world a totally different idea from that of material things? Has matter in its very depths any idea so pure, simple, and immaterial as that of spirit? How can it be the principle of that which denies and excludes matter from its own existence? How can matter be what thinks in man; that is, the very source of his conviction that he is not matter?

LA BRUYÈRE: *Des Esprits-Torts.*

191. People really do not know what they mean by complaining that vice is happy and virtue unhappy in this world. . . . It is manifestly proved that ills of every sort rain down on the human race like bullets on an army, without any distinction of persons. Now, if the good man does not suffer *because he is good*, and if the wicked does not prosper *because he is wicked*, the objection disappears and common sense has triumphed.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE: *Les Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg.*

192. Syllogisms consist of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the signs of notions; therefore, if our notions, the basis of all, are confined and overhastily taken from things, nothing that is built on them can be firm.

BACON: *Novum Organum.*

193. If lawyers can find no reason for a law, they presume that it once had a good one; and because it once had a good one, it has so still. Therefore, it ought to be retained.

BENTHAM.

194. If God exists, He possesses life; if He has life, He has senses; if He has senses, He is subject to cor-

ruption. If He has no body, He has no soul, and is therefore incapable of action ; and if He possesses a body, He is perishable.

MONTAIGNE.

195. "If God exists, He is perfect ; if He is perfect, He is wise, almighty, just ; if He is just and almighty, my soul is immortal ; if my soul is immortal, thirty years of life are nothing to me, and these years, with all that happens in them, may be necessary for the maintenance of the universe." If the first proposition is admitted, the rest can never be shaken ; if it be denied, there is no use in disputing about its consequences.

EDWARD CAIRD : *Essay on Rousseau.*

196. The only evil of hunger is that it produces first pain, then sickness, and finally death. If it did not produce these, it would be no calamity. If these are not evils, it is no calamity. We will propose a very plain dilemma : either physical pain is an evil, or it is not an evil. If it is an evil, then there is necessary evil in the universe ; if it is not, why should the poor be delivered from it ?

MACAULAY : *Southey's Colloquies.*

197. If an exile or banished man is driven from his country for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to punish him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to nations the right of punishing only for their defence and safety ; whence it follows that he can only be punished by those whom he has offended. But this reason shows that if the justice of each nation ought

in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed within its own territories, we ought to except from this rule the villains who, by the quality and frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations by trampling under foot the foundations of the common safety.

BURKE: *On the Policy of the Allies* (Appendix).

198. If our first principles are intuitively certain, and if we reason from them consequentially, our conclusions will be demonstratively certain; but if our principles be only intuitively probable, our conclusions will be only demonstratively probable. In mathematics, the first principles from which we reason are a set of axioms which are not only intuitively certain, but of which we find it impossible to conceive the contraries¹ to be true; and hence the peculiar evidence which belongs to all the conclusions that follow from these principles as necessary consequences. *Quoted in the Works of Dugald Stewart, Vol. III, p. 30.*

199. If no man has a right to political power, then neither Jew nor Gentile has such a right. The whole foundation of government is taken away. But if government be taken away, the property and the persons of men are insecure; and it is acknowledged that men have a right to their property and to personal security. If it be right that the property of men should be protected,

¹ Contradictories would be the strictly logical term.

and if this can only be done by means of government, then it must be right that government should exist. Now there cannot be government unless some person or persons possess political power. Therefore, it is right that some person or persons should possess political power. That is to say, some person or persons must have a right to political power.

MACAULAY: *Essay on the Civil Disabilities of the Jews.*

200. If our life was perfect, we should know nothing but pleasure. As it is imperfect, we have to know both pleasure and pain; now, it is from the experience of these two contraries that we get the idea of good and evil. But as pleasure and pain do not come to all men in the same way, we attach the idea of good and evil to various objects, each according to his experience, his passions, his opinions, etc.

VAUVENARGUES: *De l'Esprit Humain*, XXII.

201. I infer thus. If it is true that painting employs in its imitations quite different media or signs from poetry, the former employing shapes and colors in space, the latter articulate tones in time; if it is unquestionable that the signs must have a convenient relation to the thing signified, then coexisting signs can only express objects which coexist, or whose parts coexist, and successive signs can only express objects which are successive, or whose parts are successive.

Objects which coexist, or whose parts coexist, are called bodies. Consequently bodies with their visible qualities are the proper objects of painting. *

Objects which are in succession, or whose parts are in succession, are called actions. Consequently actions are the proper objects of poetry.

LESSING: *Laokoon*, Sect. XVI (transl. by E. Frothingham).

202. The empirical argument (of pessimism) may be shortly stated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism.

If happiness be attainable at all, it must be attainable either in life or earth as it exists at present, or, in a transcendental life after death; or (disregarding existing individuals) in a more highly developed state of society on earth at some future time. But it is not attainable in any of these ways. Therefore it is not attainable at all.

J. W. BARLOW: *The Ultimatum of Pessimism*, p. 15.

203. Men believe either what is actual fact or what is probable; this is believed; this, therefore, is either a fact or probable; now it is not probable, therefore it is a fact.

ARISTOTLE: *Rhetoric* (Bohn's transl.).

204. What one can plead, the rest can plead as well;
 For amongst equals lies no last appeal,
 And all confess themselves are fallible.
 Now, since you grant some necessary guide,
 All who can err are justly laid aside,
 Because a trust so sacred to confer
 Shews want of such a sure interpreter;
 And how can he be needful who can err?
 Then, granting that unerring guide we want,
 That such there is you stand obliged to grant;

* * * * *

It then remains that Church can only be
 The guide, which owns unfailing certainty ;
 Or else you slip your hold, and change your side,
 Relapsing from a necessary guide.

DRYDEN: *The Hind and the Panther*, Pt. II, 474-486.

205. That the hour of dissolution cannot possibly be far distant from an old man is most undoubtedly certain; but unhappy indeed must he be, if in so long a course of years he has yet to learn that there is nothing in that circumstance which can remarkably alarm his fears: on the contrary, it is an event either utterly to be disregarded, if it extinguish the soul's existence; or much to be wished, if it convey her to some region where she shall continue to exist forever. One of these two consequences must necessarily ensue the disunion of the soul and body; there is no other possible alternative. What then have I to fear, if after death I shall either not be miserable, or shall certainly be happy?

CICERO: *De Senectute*, XIX (Melmoth's transl.).

206. Philosophers are always giving out the following dilemma in order to console us in our mortal condition:—

The soul is either mortal or immortal.

If it is mortal, it will suffer no pain.

If immortal, it will go on improving.

They never handle the other branch, "What if it should become worse?" and they leave to poets the threats of future punishment, thus making matters very easy for themselves.

MONTAIGNE: *Essais*, II, 12.

207. Dr. Edmunds had maintained that no amount of evidence would make him believe in certain obvious absurdities, say the lions in Trafalgar Square drinking out of the fountains. Mr. Wallace replied: 'The asserted fact is either possible or not possible. If possible, such evidence as we have been considering would prove it; if not possible, such evidence could not exist.' No such evidence exists for the lions; for the phenomena of so-called spiritualism, we have consentient testimony in every land, period, and stage of culture. That certainly makes a difference, whatever the weight and value of the difference may be.

ANDREW LANG: *Cock Lane and Common-Sense*, p. 21, note.

208. The essence of the Charter is universal suffrage. If you withhold that, it matters not very much what else you grant. If you grant that, it matters not at all what else you withhold. If you grant that, the country is lost.

MACAULAY: *The People's Charter*.

209. Thomas Anglus, when reproached for the obscurity of his writings, replied:—

Either the learned understand me, or they do not.

If they understand me, and find me in error, it is an easy matter for them to refute me.

If they do not understand me, it is very unreasonable of them to cry out against my teachings.

DISRAELI: *Curiosities of Literature*.

210. No honest man will plead for an accused person; for the accused is either guilty or innocent. If the

accused is guilty, he ought not to be defended ; and if he is innocent, it must be apparent to his judges.

211. Either the education of the poor will be general, or it will not. If it is not, and only a few are educated, then it is a distinction, and those few may be proud.

If it be general, it ceases to be a distinction and at the same time a ground of pride. JOHNSON: in *Boswell*.

212. A Jacobite, Sir, believes in the divine right of kings. He that believes in the divine right of kings believes in a divinity. A Jacobite believes in the divine right of Bishops. He that believes in the divine right of Bishops believes in the divine authority of the Christian religion. Therefore, Sir, a Jacobite is neither an Atheist nor a Deist. That cannot be said of a Whig ; for Whiggism is a negation of all principle.

JOHNSON: in *Boswell*.

213. If canals could be profitably opened, it would not only be superfluous and absurd, but positively pernicious for government to undertake them ; for in this case private interests would accomplish the object far more economically. If they could *not* be opened with a profit, it would be pernicious to force capital into an unproductive channel. In either case, therefore, nothing but mischief can result from the interference of government.

TORRENS: *Against the Construction of Public Works by Government*.

214. Do the slaves diminish in numbers? It can be nothing but ill-treatment that causes the diminution.

This ill-treatment the abolition must and will restrain. In this case, therefore, we ought to vote for the abolition. On the other hand, do you choose to say that the slaves clearly increase in numbers? Then you want no importations, and in this case also you may safely vote for the abolition. Or, if you choose to say, as the third and only other case which can be put, and which perhaps is the nearest to the truth, that the population is nearly stationary, and the treatment neither so bad nor so good as it might be; then surely, sir, it will not be denied that this of all others is, on each of the two grounds, the proper period for stopping further supplies: for your population, which you own is already stationary, will thus be made undoubtedly to increase from the births, and the good treatment of your present slaves, which I am now supposing is but very moderate, will be necessarily improved also by the same measure of abolition. I say, therefore, that these propositions, contradictory as they may be represented, are in truth not at all inconsistent, but even come in aid of each other, and lead to a conclusion that is decisive.

PITT: *Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1792.*

215. "*In rerum naturâ* (said Don Ferrante), there are but two genera of things: substances and accidents; and if I prove that the plague cannot be either the one or the other, I shall have proved that it has no existence, and is a chimera. Thus: substances are either spiritual or material. That the plague is a spiritual substance is an absurdity which no one would maintain; therefore, no need of discussing it. Material substances are either

simple or compound. Now, that the plague is not a simple substance is demonstrable in four words. It is not an ærial substance ; for, if it were so, it would, instead of passing from one body to another, immediately fly to its own sphere. It is not watery, for it would moisten, and would dry in the wind. It is not fiery, for it would burn. It is not earthy, for it would be visible. Neither is it a compound substance ; for it would have to be sensible to sight or touch ; and who has ever seen the plague ? We must go on to see whether it can be an accident. Worse and worse. These doctors tell us that it is transmitted from one body to another ; and this is their Achilles, their pretext for prescriptions without foundation. Now, supposing it to be an accident, it would become a transmitted accident, two words which are irreconcilable (incompatible), for nothing in all philosophy is clearer than this, namely, that an accident cannot pass from one subject to another. And if, in order to avoid this Scylla, they call it a produced accident, then they fall into Charybdis ; for if it is produced, it is not communicated, does not spread, as they chatteringly declare. With these principles, what is the use of talking about pimples, exanthemata, carbuncles . . . ?”

“ All trifles and nonsense,” said one.

“ No, no,” resumed Don Ferrante, “ I don’t say that : science is science : only one should know how to apply it. Exanthemata, carbuncles, glandular swellings, . . . etc., are all respectable words with their very proper and sound meaning ; but I say that they have nothing whatever to do with the question.”

MANZONI : *I Promessi Sposi*, ch. 37.

216. An abundant stream divides two limits of one property, . . . and over this stream stood a bridge ; and at the head of it a gallows, over which were appointed four judges to decide according to the law established by the lord of the stream, the bridge, and the territory. The law ran in this wise : “ If any one shall pass over this bridge from one side to the other, he must first swear as to whence he comes and on what business he is bound, and if he swear truly he must be allowed to go ; but if he swear falsely he shall on that account die by hanging on the gallows which is there ; and that without remission whatever.” This law and its stern conditions being known, many went over ; and as soon as it was perceived that they swore truly, the judges allowed them to pass freely. It happened, however, that on swearing one man, he took the oath and declared that he was going to die on that gallows, and that he had no other business. The judges consulted the terms of the oath, and said : “ If we allow that man to go free, he has sworn falsely, and according to the law he ought to die ; and if we hang him, the oath that he was going to hang on that gallows was true, and according to the same law he ought to be free.” . . . “ I then say,” replied Sancho, “ that of that man the part that told the truth should go free, and the part that spake false shall be hanged ; and thus the condition of going over shall be fulfilled to the letter.” “ Then, Sir Governor,” replied the petitioner, “ it will be necessary to divide the man into parts, — the lying and the truthful, — and if he is divided, he will surely die.” . . . Sancho replied : “ If the

reasons are equally good for hanging and for freeing the man, let him go, for it is always more blessed to do good than to do evil, . . . and my master Don Quixote gave me this precept : When justice hangs in the balance, it is best to take the side of mercy."

CERVANTES: *Don Quixote*, Pt. 11, ch. 51.

217. A man cannot lose either the past or the future ; for what a man has not, how can any man take this from him ?

MARCUS AURELIUS.

218. It has been argued that there can be no real distinction between right and wrong, for whatever is, is right, and wrong certainly is.

219. A. You admitted but a moment ago that two negatives make an affirmative, did you not ? Thus, when you say, "not involuntary," you really mean voluntary.

B. Yes, this seems to me indisputable.

A. In that case, every time a man says "No, no," he means "Yes."

220. Solomon says that a backbiter separates between chief friends, and so does the winter.

COWPER: *Correspondence*.

221. Words are but wind ; and learning is nothing but words ; *ergo*, learning is nothing but wind.

SWIFT: *A Tale of a Tub*, Sec. VIII.

222. On the strength of the two following dicta of Carlyle, a fallacy was heard the other day to be committed ; what was it ?

Perfect ignorance is quiet.

Perfect knowledge is quiet.

And since the same philosopher declares that happy men, and also wise men, are full of the present, it has in similar fashion been held that the wise are happy

223. Apology for a counterfeiter :—

Why should a man be hanged for making money, when every one complains of the want of it ?

The Rambler, No. 161.

224. If the golden age is passed, it was not genuine. Gold cannot rust or decay ; it comes out of all admixtures, and all decompositions, pure and indestructible.

A. W. VON SCHLEGEL.

225. Although “absence makes the heart grow fonder,” if we find that we have not the requisite number of attendance marks at college, we do not expect to be greeted very fondly when we present ourselves for examination.

Student's illustration of “ambiguous middle.”

226. The real truth of the matter is, that the water along the Posilipo shore is too pure and too cold for them ; they prefer it with the chill off, and think that the admixture of a little sewage makes it more stimulating and strengthening. Liquid manure is good for

vegetables : all flesh is grass, and man as the flower of the field : therefore liquid manure is good for human beings.

W. J. A. STAINER: *Dolce Napoli*, p. 139.

227. *Manes*. — I will prove that my bodie was immortal ; because it was in prison.

Gran. — As how ?

Manes. — Did your masters never teach you that the soule was immortal ?

Gran. — Yes.

Manes. — And the bodie is the prison of the soule.

Gran. — True.

Manes. — Why then, thus to make my bodie immortal, I put it in prison.

JOHN LILLY: *Campaspe*, Act I, Sc. 2.

228. *Soc*. — Truth and sincerity are very precious things, are they not ?

Alc. — Yes, truly, I think of all things the most precious.

Soc. — And do we not generally keep our most precious gifts for our friends alone ?

Alc. — No doubt we do so.

Soc. — You will not deny, then, that truth and sincerity should be given to our friends ?

Alc. — Certainly, we ought to give them to those we love.

Soc. — Ought we not also to deny them to our enemies ?

Alc. — It certainly seems so, from the argument ; but I like not this conclusion.

229. *Simo*.—Here is what I remember to have heard from some sage: “An art is a set of rules based on perceptions carefully and consistently trained to serve some good and useful end—some end that belongs to life.”

Tychiades.—Your memory has not failed you as far as that authority goes.

Simo.—Well, if dining out includes all these points, it is an art, and nothing else, is it not?

Tychiades.—Undoubtedly, in that case, it is an art.

LUCIAN: *The Parasite* (transl. by Irwin).

230. If a personal interpretation of the book of Revelation is permissible, how can it be denied in the case of the book of Nature?

DRAPER: *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*, p. 363.

231. Dryden authorizes the conceit that medicine can never be useful or requisite, because—

“God never made his works for man to mend.”

DE QUINCEY: *Casuistry*, note 6.

232. Is not a journeyman barber as good as a journeyman baker? The only difference is, the baker uses flour for the belly, and the barber uses it for the head; and as the head is a more noble member than the belly, so is a barber more noble than a baker; for what is the belly without the head? SMOLLETT: *Roderick Random*, ch. 17.

233. The Bible says the Jews were a nation favored by God; but I, who am a freethinker, say that cannot be, because the Jews lived in a corner of the earth, and

freethinking makes it plain that those who live in corners cannot be favorites of God. The New Testament all along asserts the truth of Christianity, but freethinking denies it, because Christianity was communicated but to few, and whatever is communicated but to few cannot be true; for that is like whispering, and the proverb says that there is no whispering without lying.

SWIFT.

234. How many languages are there which you do not understand—the Punic, Spanish, Gallic, Egyptian, etc.? With regard to all these, you are as if you were deaf, yet you are indifferent about the matter. Is it then so great a misfortune to be deaf to one language more?

Cicero's stoical consolation for deafness in Tusc. Quest., Bk. V.

Quoted by Hume in "The Sceptic."

235. Goodness in action is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is done well we term *right*. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end; so in action, that which doth lie the evenest between us and the end we desire must needs be the fittest for our use.

HOOKER; *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. I, ch. 8, 2.

236. "All flesh is grass," is not only metaphorically, but literally true; for all those creatures we behold are but the herbs of the field, digested into flesh in them, or more remotely carnified in ourselves. Nay, further, we are what we all abhor, *anthropophagi*, and cannibals, devourers not only of men, but of ourselves; and that

not in an allegory but a positive truth : for all this mass of flesh which we behold, came in at our mouths : this frame we look upon, hath been upon our trenchers ; in brief we have devoured ourselves.

SIR THOMAS BROWNE : *Religio Medici*, Sect. XXXVII.

237. *Why* does the murderer deserve death? The answer will be, because he has deliberately taken human life. Then, of course, the same guilt is perpetrated, and the same penalty incurred, when the law deliberately takes human life in return. For wherein is there a difference? Both acts of homicide are perpetrated wilfully ; and to our mind the homicide of the law is worse than the homicide of the assassin, inasmuch as it is committed in cool blood, and in the sight of day.

Eclectic Review, July, 1849.

238. There existed, fifty years ago, a most irrational prejudice, very strongly rooted in the social conventions of the time, about masculine and feminine accomplishments. . . . This illogical prejudice was based on a bad syllogism of this kind : —

Girls speak French, and learn music and drawing.

Benjamin speaks French, and learns music and drawing.

Benjamin is a girl.

HAMERTON : *The Intellectual Life*, pp. 241, 242.

239. Enthydemus . . . began nearly as follows : O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant ? . . . Cleinias answered that those who learned wére the wise.

Enthydemus proceeded : There are those whom you call teachers, are there not ?

The boy assented.

And they are the teachers of those who learn ; the grammar master and the lyre master used to teach you and other boys ; and you were the learners ?

Yes.

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning ?

No, he said.

And were you wise then ?

No, indeed, he said.

But if you were not wise you were unlearned.

Certainly.

You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning ?

The youth nodded assent.

Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine. . . .

Then before the youth had well time to recover, Dionysodorus took him in hand and said : Yes, Cleinias ; and when the grammar master dictated to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation ?

The wise, replied Cleinias.

Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned ; and your last answer to Enthydemus was wrong.

PLATO : *Enthydemus*, p. 276.

240. The best of all taxes are taxes on consumption and taxes on the transfer of property : now all the latter

and many of the former are levied by stamps; stamp duties therefore are good taxes, and taxes on justice are all stamp duties; therefore taxes on justice are good taxes. BENTHAM: *Protest against Law Taxes*, summarized by Jevons.

241. This particular problem, which (as you see) offers some difficulties, was presented to no less than eight classes in other schools, before this one; and it was found on every occasion that every pupil who solved it was above the average in general ability. Now, in your class not a single pupil has succeeded in working it; and the obvious inference is that you must have unusually poor material to deal with.

Letter of a school inspector to a teacher.

242. He (Aristotle) proves the *world* to be perfect, because it consists of *bodies*; and that *bodies* are so, because they consist of a *triple dimension*; and that a *triple dimension* is perfect, because *three* are *all*; and that *three* are *all*, because when 't is but *one* or *two*, we can't say *all*, but when 't is *three*, we may. Is not this an absolute *demonstration*? We can say *all* at the number *three*: therefore the world is perfect.

GLANVILL: *Sceptis Scientifica*, ch. 19.

243. Why has not Man a microscopic eye?
For this plain reason, Man is not a Fly.

POPE: *Essay on Man*, I, 193, 194.

244. I believe that any disturbance of the repose of the world is very remote, because it is our undeniable

right and an unquestionable duty to be prepared with the means of defence, should such an event occur.

BROUGHAM: *Quoted in Life of George Eliot.*

245. Those who cannot be charming are not great, and you prove this, for you are charming.

VICTOR HUGO to GEORGE SAND (1862)

246. The martyrdom of men in support of a dogma, so far from proving its truth, proves rather its doubtfulness, no geometer having thought it ever worth his while to die in order to establish any mathematical proposition, truth needing no such sacrifices, which are actually unserviceable and useless to it, since it is able spontaneously to force its own way.

DRAPER: *The Intellectual Development of Europe*, Vol. II, pp. 197, 198.

247. Ambiguities in Latin, which possesses no article, are much more numerous than in German; as, for example, in the well-known example in which a drunken student says that he has not drunk 'vinum,' because he avails himself of the *reservatio mentalis* of understanding by 'vinum' wine in its full extent, that is, all the wine that exists; and the wine that exists in India, or even in his neighbor's glass, he has, of course, not drunk.

LANGE: *History of Materialism*, Vol. I, p. 212.

248. Nature teaches us of two evils to choose the least: and to bear with oppression as long as there is a necessity of so doing; and you will infer from hence that tyrants have some right by the law of nature to

oppress their subjects, and go unpunished, because, as circumstances may fall out, it may sometimes be a less mischief to bear with them than to remove them.

MILTON: *A Defence of the People of England*.

249. When we are ill of a bodily disease, we consult a physician in order to learn the nature of the malady, and to be cured of it; consequently, when we are in moral perplexity, or when we have been guilty of some wrong (which is moral disease), we ought to consult a healer of consciences; that is, a moral adviser.

250. To the philosopher the State is a human organism, a human person; but if so, the human spirit which lives in it must also have a human body, for spirit and body belong to one another, and between them make up the person. In a body which is not organized and human the spirit of man cannot truly live. The body politic must therefore imitate the body natural of man. The perfect State is, as it were, the visible body of Humanity.

BLÜNTSCHLI: *The Theory of the State*, Bk. I, ch. 2.

251. If a general is permitted to lead whole regiments to slaughter for the honour of the country, it is mere prejudice which forbids a great *savant* to sacrifice a few existences for a magnificent discovery, such as that of the virus of rabies or of diphtheria. . . . Why should we not admit the existence of other battlefields than those on which death is encountered for the caprice of a ruler or the aggrandisement of a country? . . . Why should

there not be glorious engagements in which defeat would be inflicted on the scourges that depopulate the world?

FRANÇOIS DE CUREL: *La Nouvelle Idole*.

252. His assertion that because it would be no sin to divert the course of the Danube, therefore it is none to let out a few ounces of blood from an artery, would justify not suicide only, but homicide also. For the lives of ten thousand men are of less consequence to their country than the course of that river to the regions through which it flows. Population would soon make society amends for the loss of her ten thousand members, but the loss of the Danube would be felt by all the millions that dwell upon its banks, to all generations. But the life of a man and the water of a river can never come into competition with each other, in point of value, unless in the estimation of an unprincipled philosopher.

COWPER: *On Hume's Apology for Suicide*.

253. Suicide is indeed one of those acts which may be condemned by moralists as a sin, but which, in modern times at least, cannot be regarded as within the legitimate sphere of law; for a society which accords to its members perfect liberty of emigration, cannot reasonably pronounce the simple renunciation of life to be an offence against itself.

W. E. H. LECKY: *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 51.

254. The vital force which at present constitutes our personality, and builds it up, is perpetually changing. Not for two moments of time is the arrangement of the

molecules of matter within any living organism the same ; nor is the coexistence of thought and feeling stationary for a single instant within the mind of any individual. Our present life is a dynamical process of incessant change, of progressive evolution and development ; but throughout this whole process, our individuality survives. Individuality is not only consistent with change, but change is absolutely necessary to it. It is essential to the very life of the individual. Why, then, may not the individuality of the individual continue after the larger and more thoroughgoing change of the molecules which we call death ?

W. KNIGHT : *Immortality.*

255. . . . Some would scratch their heads, and try
 What they should write, and how, and why ;
 But I conceive, such folks are quite in
 Mistakes, in theory of writing.
 If once for principle 't is laid,
 That thought is trouble to the head ;
 I argue thus : the world agrees,
 That he writes well, who writes with ease :
 Then he, by sequel logical,
 Writes best, who never thinks at all.

PRYOR : *Epistle to Fleetwood Shepherd.*

256. Look here ; you and I have roomed together for nearly three years, and have discussed many subjects during that time. Now, I have never once heard you admit yourself beaten in argument, nor even suggest you might be wrong. You must think yourself infallible.

Remark of student to his friend.

257. That which the commonalty accounts true, is most part false ; they are still opposite to wise men ; but all the world is of this humor (*vulgus*) ; and thou thyself art *de vulgo*, one of the commonalty ; and he, and he ; and so are all the rest ; and therefore to be approved in nought you say or do, mere idiots and asses.

BURTON : *The Anatomy of Melancholy*.

258. Gentlemen, we have heard from all the representatives of the different classes of laboring men, and their conclusions all point in one direction. Every representative has in turn shown the benefits which have accrued to his trade or occupation by striking for shorter hours and higher wages. Now, what is good for one must be good for all ; and I consequently call upon all united workmen to join in demanding, by the same method, the rights which they are thus certain to gain.

Quoted, verbatim, from a speech at a labor union.

259. To hear the roaring of the sea as one does, one must hear the parts which compose its totality, that is, the sound of each wave, . . . although this noise would not be noticed if the wave were alone. One must be affected a little by the movement of one wave, one must have some perception of each several noise, however small it be. Otherwise one would not hear that of 100,000 waves, for of 100,000 zeros one can never make a quantity.

LEIBNIZ.

260. If the Liberty of a man consists in the Empire of his Reason, the absence whereof would betray him to the bondage of his Passions ; then the Liberty of a

Commonwealth consists in the Empire of her Laws, the absence whereof would betray her to the Lust of Tyrants. And these I conceive to be the Principles upon which ARISTOTLE and LIVY (injuriously accused by LEVIATHAN for not writing out of nature) have grounded their assertion, that a Commonwealth is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. But they must not carry it so. "For," says he, "the Liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honorable mention in the History and Philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and the Writings and Discourses of those that from them have received all their learning in the Politics, is not the Liberty of particular Men, but the Liberty of the Commonwealth." He might as well have said, that the Estates of particular Men in a Commonwealth are not the Riches of particular Men, but the Riches of the Commonwealth; for equality of Estates causes equality of Power, and equality of Power is the Liberty not only of the Commonwealth but of every Man.

JAMES HARRINGTON: *Oceana*.

261. David said in his wrath, All men are liars.

Therefore, David was a liar.

Therefore, What David said was not true.

Therefore, David was not a liar.

But if David was not a liar, what he said was true — namely, that all men are liars.

262. The accusers, in answer to Pilate, declared as follows: "If he had not been worthy of death, we

would not have brought him before thee." Discuss fully the implication and assumptions involved in this assertion.

263. The public are a parcel of blockheads, and all blockheads are critics, and all critics are spiders, and spiders are a set of reptiles that all the world despises.

GOLDSMITH: *Critical Review*, March, 1760.

264. Quiquid continetur in loco, corporeum est.

At spiritus continetur in loco.

Ergo, spiritus corporeum est.

Si spiritus sunt quanti, sunt corporei.

At sunt quanti; ergo, corporei.

BURTON: *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, Pt. I, Sect. 1, mem. 1, subs. 1.

265. Interest created priests; priests created prejudices; prejudices gave rise to wars: and wars will last so long as there are prejudices, prejudices so long as there are priests, and priests so long as it is anybody's interest to be one.

DIDEROT: *The Sceptic's Walk*.

266. Bodine goes further yet, and will have the *animae separatae*, genii, spirits, angels, devils and so likewise souls of men departed, if corporeal (which he most eagerly contends), to be of some shape, and that absolutely round, like sun and moon, because that is the most perfect form, *quae nihil habet asperitatis, nihil angulis incisum, nihil aufractibus involutum, nihil eminens, sed inter corpora est perfectissima*; therefore all spirits (he concludes) are in their proper shapes round.

BURTON: *The Anatomy of Melancholy*.

267. A person contended that a dress folded up tightly weighed more than a loosely folded one, and had trunks made large so as to diminish the charge for freight.

GORE: *The Art of Scientific Enquiry*, p. 132.

268. A very clever but somewhat paradoxical journal seriously complained not long ago that seven men were sentenced to death for one murder; evidently thinking that seven 'lives' ought not to be sacrificed in retaliation for one.

PERCY GREG: *The Devil's Advocate*, Vol. I, p. 156.

269. Those who set up Nature as a standard of action do not intend a merely verbal proposition; they do not mean that the standard, whatever it be, should be *called* Nature; they think they are giving some information as to what the standard of action really is. They who say that we ought to act according to Nature do not mean the mere identical proposition that we ought to do what we ought to do. They think that the word Nature affords some external criterion of what we should do; and if they lay down as a rule for what ought to be, a word which in its proper signification denotes what is, they do so because they have a notion, either clearly or confusedly, that what is, constitutes the rule and standard of what ought to be.

J. S. MILL: *Nature*.

270. "What is capable of reason," says Zeno, "is better than what is not capable of it; there is nothing better than the world; it is therefore capable of reason." Cotta, by this very same mode of reasoning, makes of

the world a mathematician ; and further of it a musician and organist according to the following argument, also drawn from Zeno. "The whole is greater than the part ; we are capable of wisdom, and we are parts of the world ; hence the world is wise."

MONTAIGNE: *Essais*, II, 12.

271. Zeno, with his dry syllogistic method, argued thus: "That which uses reason is better than that which does not use reason ; but nothing is better than the universe ; therefore the universe uses reason." And again, "Of nothing that is without sense can any part be sentient ; but parts of the universe are sentient ; the universe, therefore, is not without sense." And once more, "Nothing that is destitute of mind and reason can generate from itself a living being endowed with reason ; but the universe generates living beings endowed with reason ; therefore the universe is a living being and endowed with reason."

J. DRUMMOND: *Philo Judaeus*, p. 78.

272. There is still preserved at Richmond the model of a bridge, constructed by . . . Mr. Atwood . . . in the confidence that he had explained the wonderful properties of the arch as resulting from the compound action of simple wedges, or of the rectilinear solids of which the material arch was composed ; and of which supposed discovery his model was to exhibit ocular proof. Accordingly, he took a sufficient number of wedges of brass highly polished. Arranging these at first on a skeleton arch of wood, he then removed this

scaffolding or support ; and the bridge not only stood firm, without any cement between the squares, but he could take away any given portion of them, as a third or a half, and appending a corresponding weight, at either side, the remaining part stood as before. Our venerable sovereign . . . said : “ But, Mr. Atwood, you have presumed the figure. You have put the arch first in this wooden skeleton. Can you build a bridge of the same wedges in any other figure? A straight bridge, or with two lines touching at the apex? If not, is it not evident that the bits of brass derive their continuance in the present position from the property of the arch, and not the arch from the property of the wedge?” The objection was fatal, the justice of the remark not to be resisted ; and I have ever deemed it a forcible illustration of the Aristotelian axiom, with respect to all just reasoning, that the whole is of necessity prior to its parts.

COLERIDGE: *The Friend*, II, 10.

273. Nothing can be more obvious than that all animals were created solely and exclusively for the use of man.

“ Even the tiger that devours him?” said Mr. Escot.

“ Certainly,” said Dr. Gaster.

“ How do you prove it?” said Mr. Escot.

“ It requires no proof,” said Dr. Gaster : “ it is a point of doctrine. It is written, therefore it is so.”

“ Nothing can be more logical,” said Mr. Jenkison. “ It has been said,” continued he, “ that the ox was made expressly to be eaten by man : it may be said by

a parity of reasoning, that man was expressly made to be eaten by the tiger: but as wild oxen exist where there are no men, and men where there are no tigers, it would seem that in these instances they do not properly answer the ends of their creation."

THOMAS LOVE PEACOCK: *Headlong Hall*, ch. 2.

274. What principle is assumed in the following quotations, and in how far is it logically applied?

Water was made to bear the great structures which we call ships.

FÉNELON.

Dogs are commonly of two different colors — one light, and the other brownish — in order that wherever they may be in a house, they may be easily distinguished when on articles of furniture, with the color of which they would otherwise be confounded.

BERNARDIN DE SAINT-PIERRE.

Fleas, wherever they happen to be, jump on light-colored objects. This instinct was given to them in order that we might catch them more easily.

BERNARDIN DE SAINT-PIERRE.

The melon is naturally divided into slices, and thus is intended as a *family* fruit; while the pumpkin, on account of its larger size, may be shared with neighbors.

BERNARDIN DE SAINT-PIERRE.

275. I will conclude, therefore, that if a judge should have a prejudice in respect of persons, it should become you rather to have a *faith implicit* in my judgment, as well as in respect of some skill I have in divinity, as also

that I hope no honest man doubts of the uprightness of my conscience. And the best thankfulness that you that are so far "*my creature*," can use towards me is to reverence and follow my judgment and not to contradict it, except where you may demonstrate unto me that I am mistaken or wrong informed.

James I to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

276. How (it has been asked) does a child come to form the very abstract and metaphysical idea expressed by the pronoun *I* or *moi*? In answer to this question, I have only to observe that when we set about the explanation of a phenomenon, we must proceed on the supposition that it is possible to resolve it into some more general law or laws with which we are already acquainted. But in the case before us, how can this be expected, by those who consider that all our knowledge of mind is derived from the exercise of reflection; and that every act of this power implies a conviction of our own existence as reflecting and intelligent beings? Every theory, therefore, which pretends to account for this conviction, must necessarily involve that sort of paralogism which logicians call a *petitio principii*; inasmuch as it must resolve the thing to be explained into some law or laws, the evidence of which rests ultimately on the assumption in question.

DUGALD STEWART.

277. Let us suppose that the result of a particular psychological investigation is that a certain judgment, *e.g.*, 'Everything has a cause' is '*a priori*.' The psychologist who makes this discovery is apt to trespass on

the domain of philosophy, and add, 'it is therefore true.' Now if 'Everything has a cause' is to be accepted as true, because it is 'a priori,' then for that very reason it is not ultimate; two propositions at least must be accepted before it; 1st, all 'a priori' judgments are true, and 2d, this is an 'a priori' judgment. Both of which are assertions both disputable and disputed.

A. J. BALFOUR: *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, p. 6.

278. It gives me some concern . . . to reflect that a convert made in Bedlam is more likely to be a stumbling-block to others than to advance their faith. But if it has that effect upon any, it is owing to their reasoning amiss, and drawing their conclusions from false premises. He who can ascribe an amendment of life and manners and a reformation of the heart itself to madness, is guilty of an absurdity that in any other case would fasten the imputation of madness upon himself; for by so doing he ascribes a reasonable effect to an unreasonable cause, and a positive effect to a negative.

COWPER: *Letter to Lady Hesketh*, 4th July, 1765.

279. If the President can at his pleasure, in the first instance, send troops into any city, town, or hamlet in the country, under pretence of enforcing some law, his judgment — which means his pleasure — being the sole criterion, then there can be no difference between the powers of the President and those of Emperor William or the Czar of Russia. Neither of these potentates ever claimed anything more.

Governor Altgeld to the Legislature of Illinois, Jan. 1895. Quoted in the Montreal Gazette, 11th January, 1895.

280. To say that matter is divisible, because extended, amounts to no more than saying it is so because it consists of parts distinct and removable from one another; a pretty way of proving the point, being no better than the ladies' reason, it is divisible because it is.

ABRAHAM TUCKER: *The Light of Nature*, Vol. I, p. 287.

281. Mihi a docto doctore
 Domandatur causam et rationem quaere
 Opium facit dormire.
 A quoi respondeo,
 Quia est in eo
 Vertus dormitiva
 Cujus est natura
 Sensus assoupire.

MOLIÈRE: *Le Malade Imaginaire*, III^{me} Intermède.

282. Why is the biniodide of mercury red? Because there are contained in its substance tiny particles which chemical analysis cannot bring to light and which have the power of making it red. Without these infinitesimally small particles the biniodide of mercury would not be red. Why is this drop of oil, suspended in a saline solution of equal density, spherical in shape? Because its substance contains tiny particles which chemical analysis fails to reveal and which have the power of giving the drop a spherical shape. Deprived of these infinitesimally small particles, the drop of oil would be amorphous, like Weismann's protoplasm, — not spherical.

F. LE DANTEC: *Revue Philosophique*, May, 1899.

283. Therefore when you assert that a law of progress governs the world, that life is tending from the Imperfect to the Perfect, and that this tendency results necessarily from natural selection alone, it seems to us — the profane — that you contradict yourselves, for you see the Universe developing according to so purely intellectual a concept as that of *perfection*, while you at the same time deny that intelligence presides over the Universe.

ANTONIO FOGAZZARO: "*Per la Bellezza d'un idea.*"

284. The rule of faith laid down by Vincentius of Lirineum, in the fifth century, *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, is inapplicable as a practical guide; because none of the distinctive tenets of the Christian sects, — none of the doctrines that divide Christianity, answer this description. No article of faith has been held by all Christians, at all times, and in all places. None combines the three attributes required by him, of universality, antiquity, and agreement. If, in order to make this maxim applicable, we arbitrarily exclude a certain portion of those who have laid claim to the appellation of Christians; if we call certain sects heretical and schismatical, and thus eliminate them from the aggregate body whose consent constitutes authority, then our reasoning proceeds in a circle. We begin by assuming as solved the very problem of which we are seeking the solution. We propose to test the soundness of certain doctrines by the judgment of a certain tribunal, and we make the constitution of the tribunal depend upon those very doctrines.

G. C. LEWIS, *Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion*, p. 57.

285. They suppose themselves to be in the right (as other disputants do) and their adversaries in the wrong, which yet those cannot be if there be no truth, since error is a departing from truth, and where there is no truth there can be no error, even as where there is no law there can be no sin. And a Libertine that denies all moral distinction between good and evil may as well say that a man sins, as a Sceptic that allows no truth, that a man errs. One is as inconsistent as the other, because error does as much suppose truth, as sin does the distinction of good and evil. Such sceptics, then, would overthrow themselves, allowing that truth and science *in Hypothesi* which they deny *in Thesi*. They contradict the doctrine they maintain, and in pretending to prove it, they really disprove it.

JOHN NORRIS: *The Theory of the Ideal World*, p. 63.

286. The professor did well to lay stress, not on the material triumphs of electricity, which are obvious to the most superficial observer, but on the improvement in social conditions resulting from material advantages. It may be doubted whether engineering is entitled to the credit Mr. — was inclined to give it, of uplifting legislative aims and political ideals. We have not noticed any improvement in our legislators or aldermen since the horse-cars gave way to the trolley.

Newspaper comment on an academic address.

287. Against what specific form of fallacy did Voltaire direct the following verses, referring to the earthquake at Lisbon in 1755?

“Direz-vous, en voyant cet amas de victimes ;—
 Dieu s’est vengé, la mort est le prix de leurs crimes ?

 Lisbonne est abimée et l’on danse à Paris !”

288. As he was setting out on a distant and somewhat hazardous expedition, his native servants tied round the neck of the mule a small bag supposed to be of preventive and mystic virtue. As the place was crowded and a whole townspeople looking on, Mr. Newman thought that he would take an opportunity of disproving the superstition. So he made a long speech of explanation in his best Arabic, and cut off the bag, to the horror of all about him. But as ill-fortune would have it, the mule had not got thirty yards up the street before she put her foot into a hole and broke her leg ; upon which all the natives were confirmed in their former faith in the power of the bag, and said, “ You see now what happens to unbelievers.” BAGEHOT : *Physics and Politics*, p. 132.

289. When a deadly and mysterious disease fell upon the cattle of England, some divines, not content with treating it as a judgment, proceeded to trace it to certain popular writings containing what were deemed heterodox opinions about the Pentateuch, or about the eternity of punishment. It may be true that the disease was imported from a country where such speculations are unknown ; that the authors objected to had no cattle ; that the farmers, who chiefly suffered from the disease, were for the most part absolutely unconscious of the

existence of these books, and if they knew them would have indignantly repudiated them ; that the town populations who chiefly read them were only affected indirectly by a rise in the price of food, which falls with perfect impartiality upon the orthodox and upon the heterodox ; that particular counties were peculiarly sufferers, without being at all conspicuous for their scepticism ; that similar writings appeared in former periods, without cattle being in any respect the worse ; and that at the very period at which the plague was raging, other countries, in which far more audacious speculations were rife, enjoyed an absolute immunity. In the face of all these consequences, the theory has been confidently urged and warmly applauded.

LECKY: *History of European Morals*, Vol. I, ch. 3, p. 357.

290. It is laid down, for example, that universities should "test the man for what he knows, not where he learned it," apparently under the impression that the object of restricting University degrees to those trained in particular institutions is to create a "monopoly" in favor of the institutions, or the localities where they happen to exist. The same view is almost grotesquely brought out in another passage :

"The student of St. Patrick's College, Carlow, passes through Dublin, where the Queen's University ignores him, on his way to the London University which admits him, — surely such an absurdity cannot be permitted to continue."

I do not know whether the fact that the student of St. Patrick's College, Carlow, can now obtain his degree

from London University *without* passing the site of the Queen's University, will diminish in our author's eyes the absurdity which he here discovers ; but to my mind the only absurdity in the case — and it is a very great absurdity — is the application of such tests to such subjects.

J. E. CAIRNES: *Political Essays*, p. 285.

291. Walking together in one of the principal streets of Lyons, we met the *Host*, with an accompanying crowd. "You must pull off your hat, Walduck." — "I will die first," he exclaimed. As . . . I did not wish to behold an act of martyrdom, I pulled off his hat. Afterwards, passing by the cathedral, I said to him: "I must leave you here, for I won't go in to be insulted." He followed me with his hat off. "I thought you would die first!" — "O no; here I have no business or right to be. If the owners of this building choose to make a . . . rule that no one shall enter with his hat, they do what they have a legal right to do, and I must submit to their terms. Not so in the broad highway." The reasoning was not good, but one is not critical when the conclusion is the right one practically. CRABB ROBINSON: *Diary*, Vol. I, p. 434.

292. Take for example Dr. Livingstone's argument with the negro conjurer. The missionary was trying to dissuade the savage from his fetichistic ways of invoking rain. "You see," said he, "that after all your operations, sometimes it rains and sometimes it does not, exactly as when you have not operated at all." "But," replied the sorcerer, "it is just the same with you doctors; you give your remedies, and sometimes the patient

gets well and sometimes he dies, just as when you do nothing at all." To that the pious missionary replied: "The doctor does his duty, after which God performs the cure if it pleases him." "Well," rejoined the savage, "it is just so with me. I do what is necessary to procure rain, after which God sends it or withholds it according to his pleasure." JAMES: *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 363.

293. Are you a prince of the House of Hanover, and you exclude all the leading Whig families from your councils? Do you profess to govern according to Law, and is it consistent with that profession, to impart your confidence and affection to those men only, who, though now perhaps detached from the desperate cause of the Pretender, are marked in this country by an hereditary attachment to high and arbitrary principles of government? Are you so infatuated as to take the sense of your people from the representation of ministers, or from the shouts of a mob, notoriously hired to surround your coach, or stationed at a theatre? And if you are, in reality, that public Man, that King, that Magistrate, which these questions suppose you to be, is it any answer to your people to say that among your domestics you are good-humored, — that to one lady you are faithful; — that to your children you are indulgent?

JUNIUS: *Letter to the King* (George III).

294. This reminds us of the "astounding discovery" with which Dr. Buckland is reported to have lately electrified the Bristolians. Ephraim Jenkinson's ghost must have heard with jealousy, on the banks of the

Styx, the shouts of applause which echoed the doctor's assertion on the banks of the Avon, that the world had already lasted "millions of years"; that "a new version of Genesis" would be shortly required, since a new light "had been thrown on Hebrew scholarship!" The doctor's declaration is very properly described as the only "original feat" elicited at the meeting. What fun! to hear a mite in the cavity of a Gloucester cheese gravely reasoning on the streaks (or strata) of red and yellow, and finally concluding, all things duly considered, that the invoice of the farmer who made it bears a wrong date, and that the process of fabricating the cheese in question must have been begun as long ago, at least, as the days of the Heptarchy!

FRANCIS MAHONY: *The Reliques of Father Prout*, p. 437.

295. See account of the proceedings against Governor Eyre of Jamaica, in connection with the execution of Gordon, as related by Justin McCarthy in the *History of Our Own Times*, ch. 49.

Chief Justice (Sir Alexander Cockburn).—After the most careful perusal of the evidence which was adduced against him (Gordon), I come irresistibly to the conclusion that if the man had been tried upon that evidence—I must correct myself. He could not have been tried upon that evidence. I was going too far, a great deal too far, in assuming that he could. No competent judge acquainted with the duties of his office could have received that evidence. Three-fourths, I had almost said nine-tenths, of that evidence upon

which that man was convicted and sentenced to death was evidence which according to no known rules — not only of ordinary, but of military law — according to no rules of right or justice could possibly have been admitted ; and it never would have been admitted if a competent judge had presided, or if there had been the advantage of a military officer of any experience in the practice of courts-martial.

Carlyle.— Lordship, If you were to speak six hundred years instead of six hours, you would only prove the more to us that, unwritten if you will, but real and fundamental, anterior to all written laws and first making written laws *possible*, there must have been, and is, and will be, coeval with Human Society . . . an actual *Martial Law*, of more validity than any other law whatever.

Shooting Niagara : and After?

Justin McCarthy.— The business of the Lord Chief Justice, however, was not to go in philosophical quest of those higher laws of which Mr. Carlyle assumed to be the interpreter. His was the humbler, but more practical, part to expound the laws of England, and he did his duty.

206. M. Hugo was at the Opera on the night the sentence of the Court of Peers, condemning Barbès to death, was published. The great poet composed the following verses :

“ Par votre ange envolée, ainsi qu’une colombe,
Par le royal enfant, doux et frêle roseau,

Grâce encore une fois ! Grâce au nom de la tombe !
Grâce au nom du berceau !”

* * * * *

Louis Philippe replied to the author of ‘Ruy Blas’ most graciously, that he had already subscribed to a wish so noble, and that the verses had only confirmed his previous disposition to mercy. Now in countries where fools most abound, did one ever read of more monstrous, palpable folly? In any country, save this, would a poet who chose to write four crack-brained verses, comparing an angel to a dove, and a little boy to a reed, and calling upon the chief magistrate, in the name of the angel, or dove (the Princess Mary), in her tomb, and the little infant in his cradle, have received a “gracious answer” to his nonsense? . . . Suppose the Count of Paris to be twenty times a reed, and the Princess Mary a host of angels, is that any reason why the law should not have its course?

THACKERAY: *The Paris Sketch Book.*

297. “For what are tythes and tricks but an imposition, all a confounded imposture, and I can prove it. ‘I wish you would,’ cried my son Moses, ‘and I think,’ continued he, ‘that I should be able to answer you.’ ‘Very well, sir,’ cried the Squire; . . . ‘if you are for a cool argument upon that subject, I am ready to accept the challenge. And, first, whether are you for managing it analogically or dialogically?’ ‘I am for managing it rationally,’ cried Moses, quite happy at being permitted to dispute. ‘Good again,’ cried the Squire,

‘and firstly, of the first, I hope you ’ll not deny, that whatever is, is. If you don’t grant me that, I can go no further.’ ‘Why,’ returned Moses, ‘I think I may grant that, and make the best of it.’ ‘I hope, too,’ returned the other, ‘you ’ll grant that a part is less than the whole.’ ‘I grant that too,’ cried Moses, ‘it is but just and reasonable.’ ‘I hope,’ cried the Squire, ‘you will not deny that the two angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones.’ ‘Nothing can be plainer,’ returned t’other, and looked round with his usual importance. ‘Very well,’ cried the Squire, speaking very quick, ‘the premises being thus settled, I proceed to observe, that the concatenation of self-existences proceeding in a reciprocal duplicate ratio, naturally produce a problematical dialogism, which in some measure proves that the essence of spirituality may be referred to the second predicable.’ ‘Hold, hold,’ cried the other, ‘I deny that. Do you think I can thus tamely submit to such heterodox doctrines?’ ‘What?’ replied the Squire, as if in a passion, ‘not submit? Answer me one plain question: do you think Aristotle right, when he says, that relatives are related?’ ‘Undoubtedly,’ replied the other. ‘If so, then,’ cried the Squire, ‘answer me directly to what I propose: Whether do you judge the analytical investigation of the first part of my enthymeme deficient, secundum quoad, or quoad minus? and give me your reasons; give me your reasons, I say, directly.’ ‘I protest,’ cried Moses, ‘I don’t rightly comprehend the force of your reasoning; but if it be reduced to one simple proposition, I fancy it may then have an answer.’

‘O Sir,’ cried the Squire, ‘I am your most humble servant: I find you want me to furnish you with arguments and intellect too. No, Sir, there I protest you are too hard for me.’” GOLDSMITH: *The Vicar of Wakefield*, ch. 7.

298. A short while since a certain Reviewer announced that I gave myself great pretensions as a philosopher. I a philosopher; I advance pretensions! My dear Saturday friend, and you? Don't you teach everything to everybody? and punish the naughty boys if they don't learn as you bid them? You teach politics to Lord John and Mr. Gladstone. You teach poets how to write; painters, how to paint; gentlemen, manners; and opera-dancers, how to pirouette. I was not a little amused of late by an instance of the modesty of our Saturday friend, who more Athenian than the Athenians, and *apropos* of a Greek book by a Greek author, sat down and gravely showed the Greek gentleman how to write his own language.

THACKERAY: *Roundabout Papers*. “*Small-beer Chronicle*.”

299. The advocates of this bill proposed to abolish bull-baiting on the score of cruelty. It is strange enough that such an argument should be employed by a set of persons who have a most vexatious code of laws for the protection of their own amusements. I do not mean at present to condemn the game laws; but when gentlemen talk of cruelty, I must remind them that it belongs as much to shooting, as to the sport of bull-baiting; nay more so, as it frequently happens that where one bird is shot, a great many others go off

much wounded. When therefore I hear humane gentlemen even make a boast of having wounded a number of birds in this way, it only affords me a further proof that savage sports do not make savage people.

WYNDHAM: *On the proposal to abolish bull-baiting*, 1800.

300. What is the world to think of that right honorable gentleman's (Pitt) discretion and judgment from this night, who, upon the subject of the Irish propositions, ventures neither more nor less than to charge us with shifting our ground and playing a double game? . . . For him to talk of our shifting our ground! He! who has shifted his ground until, in truth, he has no ground to stand upon! He! who has assumed so many shapes, colours, and characters, in the progress of this extraordinary undertaking! He! who has proclaimed determinations only to recede from them; who has asserted principles only to renounce them! . . . Compare the twenty propositions now upon your table with the eleven original ones, as the right honorable gentleman introduced them to this house; compare his language on that day with the language of this night; compare the nature of the two strings of propositions, substantially and fundamentally subverted in many parts, in all materially altered, with those reiterated declarations that not one principle could on any terms be meddled with. Let the House reflect upon these circumstances, and let them judge, whether a grosser piece of insanity was ever heard of, than that the author of all this miserable foolery should charge others with shifting their ground!

CHARLES JAMES FOX: *On the Irish Commercial Propositions*, 1785.

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